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JOURNEY OUT OF NEVERLAND: CORI 
REFORM, COMMONWEALTH v. PETER PON, 
AND MASSACHUSETTS’S EMERGENCE AS 
A NATIONAL EXEMPLAR FOR CRIMINAL 
RECORD SEALING 
Abstract: Even after a criminal case is disposed of and a period of incarcera-
tion or probation is completed, individuals who have become involved in the 
criminal justice system often face a myriad of collateral consequences based 
on their criminal records. In order to promote reintegration and combat recidi-
vism, many states have taken legislative actions to ease the burden associated 
with having a criminal record. In recent years, these efforts have led several 
states to reform or enact statutes for criminal record sealing or expungement, a 
controversial, yet highly efficacious tool to provide greater employment and 
housing opportunities for ex-offenders. In 2010 and in 2014 respectively, the 
Massachusetts legislature and judiciary made considerable changes to the way 
that criminal records are managed, disseminated, and sealed in the Common-
wealth’s Criminal Offender Record Information (“CORI”) system. This Note 
argues that Massachusetts has established a thorough and balanced approach 
to criminal record sealing that, with certain modifications, can serve as a 
model for reform for other states and the federal government.  
INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2010, Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick issued a press 
release in which he stated that “[t]he best way to break the cycle of recidivism 
is to make it possible for people to get a job.”1 Yet for years, many individuals 
with criminal records in Massachusetts faced serious roadblocks in their ef-
forts to obtain employment and otherwise reintegrate into society.2 John C. 
                                                                                                                           
1 Press Release, Office of Governor Deval Patrick of Mass., Governor Patrick Highlights 
New Law That Expands Job Opportunities, Protects Public Safety (Aug. 30, 2010), http://archives.
lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/125572/ocn795183245-2010-08-30c.PDF?sequence=1 [https://
perma.cc/5W3D-X2TQ].  
2 See Harriette L. Chandler, CORI Reform Needed Now, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE 
(Feb. 4, 2010 6:00 AM), http://www.telegram.com/article/20100204/news/2040648 [https://perma.
cc/T2ZG-4N3X] (describing how the existence of criminal records can serve to block ex-offenders 
from gaining employment and fuel recidivism); Milton J. Valencia, From Jail to Job: Ex-Inmates 
Say CORI System, Society Don’t Give Them a Chance, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE 
(May 17, 2007), http://ww.dismashouse.org/docs/fromjailtojob.rtf [https://perma.cc/5P9U-K7YZ] 
(describing how former inmates in Massachusetts struggled to find jobs, housing, and their place 
in society after being released from a period of imprisonment). 
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Williams, one of many ex-offenders living in Massachusetts, remarked in 
2008 that “[i]f you’re not able to take care of yourself, your family, then it’s 
hard to assimilate back into society. For me, this is personal . . . . A lot of 
people forget about the struggle there is.”3 
Incarceration, fines, probation, and other legal restrictions placed on an 
individual following a criminal conviction do not account for the totality of 
the punishment that an individual faces following a brush with the criminal 
justice system.4 For many, a one-time lapse of judgment leads to involve-
ment in the criminal justice system that in turn can have a profoundly ad-
verse impact on an ex-offender’s attempts to reintegrate with society or to 
obtain employment and housing.5 Faced with a myriad of roadblocks, the 
risk of recidivism for ex-offenders remains high.6 In light of these realities, 
                                                                                                                           
3 See Milton Valencia, A Clean Slate One Day: He Paid His Debt and Now John C. Williams 
Is Working to Change the CORI Law That He Says Keeps Others in Crime, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 6, 
2008), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/04/06/a_clean_slate_one_day [https://perma.
cc/Q78L-UEJW]. 
 4 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 102, 141 (rev. ed. 2012) (describing the stigma and collateral consequences 
that individuals with criminal records experience); Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the 
Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1335–36 (2005) (commenting on how a criminal record can result in 
diminished social and economic opportunity); RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUS-
TICE, RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CON-
VICTION, 2009–2014, at 2, 43 (2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/down
loads/states-rethink-collateral-consequences-report-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2A9-QC2X] (em-
phasizing how states and the federal government impose numerous collateral consequences on ex-
offenders that negatively impact their lives). 
 5 See Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: Concealing Information in the Infor-
mation Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1063–64 (describing how individuals with criminal records 
are subject to prejudice when attempting to reenter society and obtain employment and education-
al opportunities); Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expunge-
ment Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008) (arguing that even one arrest or conviction 
can act as a powerful and persistent limitation on one’s ability to participate in society); Meghan 
L. Schneider, From Confinement to Social Confinement: Helping Ex-Offenders Obtain Public 
Housing with a Certificate of Rehabilitation, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
335, 335–36 (2010) (explaining how certain “invisible punishments” that are not imposed by 
judges, such as decreased eligibility for housing and employment, adversely impact those with 
criminal records). 
 6 See Lorelei Laird, Ex-Offenders Face Tens of Thousands of Legal Restrictions, Bias and 
Limits on Their Rights, ABA J. (June 1, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/ex-offenders_face_tens_of_thousands_of_legal_restrictions [https://perma.cc/7UVZ-6UFH]; 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 3 in 4 Former Prisoners in 30 States Arrested Within 5 Years of 
Release (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/rprts05p0510pr.cfm [https://perma.
cc/4VBE-8WUB] (finding that in a sample of individuals released from prison in 2005, approxi-
mately 68% were rearrested within three years and approximately 77% were rearrested within five 
years); see also Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 
45 B.C. L. REV. 255, 258 (2004) (commenting on the web of collateral consequences, including 
employment obstacles and limitations on public benefits, that limits ex-offenders’ ability to suc-
cessfully reintegrate with society). 
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the availability of criminal record sealing represents a potential path to fa-
cilitate reintegration and rehabilitation through opportunity and access to 
economic and social resources.7 
Although many states have developed pathways through which indi-
viduals can seek to transcend their criminal records, very few states actually 
provide individuals with meaningful paths to opportunity or chances for 
rehabilitation.8 In recent years, there has been a growing call for the adop-
tion of a more comprehensive and efficacious approach in order to encour-
age rehabilitation and combat recidivism.9 In accordance with this trend, 
numerous state legislatures have proposed, enacted, or revised statutes that 
allow individuals to seal or expunge criminal records.10 
Beginning in 2010, the Massachusetts legislature and Supreme Judicial 
Court have made substantial changes to the way that criminal records are 
sealed, accessed, and distributed in the state.11 These changes include short-
                                                                                                                           
 7 See Mayfield, supra note 5, at 1065 (arguing that limiting access to a criminal record can 
help to “bridge the gap between society and the rehabilitated offender”); Lahny R. Silva, Clean 
Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 155, 198, 200, 205 (2010) (arguing that increased access to expungement represents a viable 
tool to decrease recidivism and incarceration). 
 8 Margaret Colgate Love, The Debt That Can Never Be Paid: A Report Card on the Collat-
eral Consequences of Conviction, 21 CRIM. JUST. 16, 24 (2006); see Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Barriers to Reentry for the Formerly Incarcerated: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–
3 (2010) [hereinafter Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions] (statement of Rep. Scott, 
Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2, 43. 
 9 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., STATE REFORMS REDUCING COLLATERAL CON-
SEQUENCES FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS: 2011–2012 ROUND-UP 1–2 (2012), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=263700 [https://perma.cc/E7LF-CL3E] (stat-
ing that there is a growing trend towards recognizing the deleterious impact of criminal records 
and creating strategies for tackling recidivism); see also Mouzon, supra note 5, at 10, 13 (arguing 
for federal standards for expungement procedures in order to facilitate ex-offender reintegration 
and provide second chances); Silva, supra note 7, at 195–96, 205 (arguing that expungement 
could represent a viable way to reduce recidivism and rehabilitate ex-offenders). 
 10 See, e.g., 2013 Ill. Legis. Serv. 98–142 (West) (amending Illinois law to allow increased 
access to criminal record sealing for felony offenses); 2010 Mass. Acts 1095–96 (revising the 
Massachusetts statute on criminal record sealing to allow individuals to seal conviction records in 
a shorter timeframe); S.B. 166, 199th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015) (proposing an expan-
sion to the state’s statute on expungement); Matthew Higbee, Foundation Urges PA House Judi-
ciary to Pass Expungement Bill SB 391, FOUND. FOR CONTINUING JUSTICE (Apr. 16, 2014), http://
www.continuingjustice.org/foundation-urges-pa-house-judiciary-to-pass-expungement-bill-sb-391 
[https://perma.cc/2KQA-S6DM] (stating that over twenty states have broadened their expunge-
ment laws since 2008).   
 11 See Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182, 190–94 (Mass. 2014) (describing the signifi-
cant 2010 legislative alteration of criminal record management and sealing in Massachusetts); 
2010 Mass. Acts 1064–101 (redesigning the system for managing, accessing, distributing, and 
sealing criminal records in Massachusetts); GABRIELLA PRIEST ET AL., THE BOS. FOUND., THE 
CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF CORI REFORM: IMPLEMENTING THE GROUNDBREAKING 2010 
MASSACHUSETTS LAW 5 (2012), http://www.bostonindicators.org/~/media/Files/Global/Articles/
Research%20Reports/CORI%20May2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW8H-NPYP] (describing the 
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er waiting times to seal conviction records, increased access to records by 
employers and agencies, and a new, more permissive standard for sealing 
non-conviction records.12 Despite these changes, some observers assert that 
the Massachusetts legislature should have made additional reforms to the 
state’s criminal record management system.13  
This Note argues that a slightly modified form of the Massachusetts 
schema for criminal record sealing should serve as the model for nationwide 
reform of criminal record sealing and expungement statutes.14 Although Mas-
sachusetts’s approach responds to many of the issues facing ex-offenders, 
certain changes need to be made before Massachusetts can be recognized as a 
true exemplar for criminal record sealing.15 Part I of this Note explores the 
underlying rationales for and against sealing criminal records, and the current 
approaches to sealing at the state and federal levels.16 Part II examines the 
recent legislative and judicial overhaul of Massachusetts’s approach to crimi-
nal record sealing.17 Finally, Part III argues for the nationwide adoption of 
certain aspects of Massachusetts’s system, as well as for the revision of cer-
tain aspects by the Massachusetts legislature and Supreme Judicial Court.18 
I. THE DIVISIVE ISSUE OF SEALING AND EXPUNGEMENT AT THE  
STATE AND FEDERAL LEVEL 
This Part examines the debate over criminal record sealing and then dis-
cusses the different approaches that the federal government and state gov-
ernments have taken.19 Section A of this Part analyzes the various societal and 
                                                                                                                           
extensive changes to the criminal record sealing approach and record management system in Mas-
sachusetts). 
 12 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 193–94 (allowing greater access to sealing for non-conviction rec-
ords); 2010 Mass. Acts 1072–78 (redesigning the core system for how criminal records are man-
aged, accessed, and disseminated); id. at 1095–96 (decreasing required waiting periods for sealing 
from fifteen to ten years for felony convictions and ten to five years for misdemeanor convic-
tions); Gregory L. Massing, CORI Reform—Providing Ex-Offenders with Increased Opportunities 
Without Compromising Employers’ Needs, 55 BOS. B.J. 21, 22–24 (2011) (outlining the multifac-
eted legislative changes made to the Massachusetts system for criminal record management). 
13 See PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5, 17 (highlighting how some advocates had hoped 
that the reform efforts would have been more comprehensive and would have focused more on the 
obstacles those with criminal records face); Dianne Williamson, Sometimes Little Problems Never 
Go Away, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Mar. 4, 2012 6:00 AM), http://www.telegram.
com/article/20120304/column01/103049858 [https://perma.cc/CRZ5-4PMG] (describing how 
Massachusetts State Representative James O’Day felt that there were some important shortcom-
ings in the 2010 reform efforts). 
 14 See infra notes 158–194 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 195–221 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 23–78 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 79–153 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 154–221 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 23–78 and accompanying text. 
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penological arguments that weigh against and in favor of criminal record seal-
ing.20 Section B of this Part examines the narrow routes to expungement and 
sealing at the federal level through judicial and statutory remedies.21 Finally, 
section C of this Part provides an overview of the differing terminology, eli-
gibility requirements, and waiting periods that states incorporate into criminal 
record sealing and expungement statutes.22 
A. The Competing Rationales Underlying Criminal Record Sealing 
States have enacted criminal record sealing and expungement remedies 
in a disparate and non-uniform fashion.23 Underlying these statutory respons-
es are divergent views on the propriety of criminal record sealing and its 
proper scope.24 
Most states have statutory provisions authorizing courts to seal or ex-
punge records in certain situations.25 Expungement is the process of destroy-
ing, erasing, or holistically preventing access to a criminal record such that 
neither the public nor governmental actors can access it.26 Sealing is a process 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 23–49 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 50–60 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 61–78 and accompanying text. 
 23 Compare ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180(b) (2014) (allowing the possibility of criminal record 
sealing only when petitioner shows beyond a reasonable doubt that his or her record was the result 
of a mistaken identification or false accusation), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.31(A)–
.32(A)(1) (West Supp. 2015) (allowing an individual to petition to have a record of a conviction 
sealed if the individual has not more than one felony conviction and one misdemeanor conviction 
or not more than two misdemeanor convictions). 
 24 Compare HELEN GAEBLER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW, 
CRIMINAL RECORDS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR REFORM IN TEXAS 16–17 (2013), http://www.utexas.edu/law/centers/publicinterest/
research/criminalrecords.pdf [https://perma.cc/E26W-5MZV] (arguing that increased access to 
sealing or expungement increases economic and social opportunity and can thus decrease recidi-
vism and increase public safety), with Zainab Wurie, Note, Tainted: The Need for Equity Based 
Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L. STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 31, 34 (2012) (pointing out 
that some detractors of record sealing feel that public knowledge of individuals’ arrest and convic-
tion records is necessary to ensure public safety), and Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 191 (recognizing that 
sealing may be undermined by the presence of third-party commercial background check provid-
ers). 
 25 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-3523(4) (Lexis through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) (allow-
ing for expungement of arrest record if the prosecution decides to dismiss a case or if the record is 
the product of an error by a law enforcement agency); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (Supp. 
2015) (providing individuals with ability to petition to “annul” non-conviction records immediate-
ly and to “annul” conviction records after applicable waiting periods); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
1.3-2(a) (Supp. 2015) (permitting first-time offenders to petition to have a misdemeanor or felony 
expunged); Mouzon, supra note 5, at 31–33 (commenting that most states have some form of 
expungement or sealing statute). 
 26 See Nicola J. Pangonis, Criminal Records: Sealing and Expungement, in MASSACHUSETTS 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, CRIME AND CONSEQUENCE: THE COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT § 18.2.1 (2013) (explaining that expungement refers to the total destruction 
of a record); Dash DeJarnatt, Note, Changing the Way Adult Convictions Are Vacated in Washing-
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where a criminal record is sequestered and prevented from being accessed by 
the public.27 Unlike an expunged record, a sealed criminal record is not actu-
ally destroyed.28 Although expungement and sealing are different in theory, 
many states define expungement in a way that can incontrovertibly be re-
ferred to as criminal record sealing.29 Further, sealing and expungement often 
provide similar relief, as both remove significant barriers to obtaining em-
ployment, housing, and other opportunities by limiting access to criminal his-
tories.30  
Perhaps the most forceful argument against sealing criminal records is 
the concern that reasonable access to these records by certain governmental 
and private actors is necessary to ensure public safety.31 Without the ability to 
effectively screen employees, some believe that the well-being of the public 
                                                                                                                           
ton State, 12 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1045, 1050–51 (2014) (explaining that expungement 
refers to the “complete destruction of records,” but that the term is often misused to refer to a less 
thorough act of concealing a record). The expungement of a record is defined by Black’s Law 
Dictionary as the “removal of a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal rec-
ord.” Expungement of record, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
27 See Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.2.1 (explaining how sealed records still exist, but are not 
accessible to the public); see also FLA. STAT. § 943.045(19) (2015) (defining “sealing of a crimi-
nal history record” as the preservation of a record in such a way that only individuals with a legal 
right to access the record or the information it contains are able to view the record); Kristin K. 
Henson, Note, Can You Make This Go Away?: Alabama’s Inconsistent Approach to Expunging 
Criminal Records, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 385, 394 & n.70 (2005) (describing how sealing a record 
involves blocking public access or view of the record without actually destroying it). 
 28 See Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.2.1; DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1058. 
 29 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-9-6(b), (d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 1st Reg. Sess.) 
(allowing “expunged” records to be accessed by prosecutors upon motion for use in subsequent 
criminal proceedings); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(k) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(requiring access to “expunged” records in subsequent criminal proceedings and applications for 
certain government employment and licensure); Henson, supra note 27, at 393 (noting that the 
process of “expungement” in many states does not involve the destruction of criminal records and 
can be more accurately labeled as criminal record sealing); Mouzon, supra note 5, at 5 & n.15 
(pointing out the dissimilar and broad language used by legislatures to define expungement). In 
Alabama for example, individuals can petition to have arrest records of misdemeanor and felony 
offenses expunged. See ALA. CODE §§ 15-27-1 to -2 (Supp. 2015). Under the Alabama statute, 
however, records are not destroyed, but are rather sequestered and statutorily mandated to remain 
open to government regulatory and licensing agencies, utilities, banks, and law enforcement. See id. 
 30 See Commonwealth v. Balboni, 642 N.E.2d 576, 577–78 (Mass. 1994) (describing the 
similarity between the remedy offered by sealing and expungement); see also Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Is-
sues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 647–48 (2006) (identify-
ing the argument that a variety of mechanisms can be efficacious in countering the negative im-
pact of collateral consequences of criminal convictions). 
 31 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.03(5)(a)–(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) 
(stating that the individual benefits of expunging a criminal record must be balanced with potential 
disadvantages to public safety); James G. Gilbert, Free Liberty to Search and View: A Look at 
Public Access to Criminal Offender Record Information in the Commonwealth, 41 BOS. B.J. 12, 
12, 22 (1997) (pointing out that some opponents of broad criminal record sealing schemas argue 
that access to criminal records is necessary to ensure the safety of the public). 
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is put at risk because individuals may be given responsibilities or roles incon-
sistent with prior violent, dishonest, or reckless conduct.32 Even in certain 
states with sealing statutes, specific provisions are included which mandate 
disclosure of criminal history information to specific categories of employers 
and governmental agencies.33  
There are also First Amendment arguments against criminal record 
sealing.34 Although an individual may have a strong personal interest in 
having a criminal record sealed, some courts have determined that this per-
sonal interest must be weighed against the public’s First Amendment right 
to access criminal records.35 In 1980, in Richmond Papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that there is a presumption of open access 
under the First Amendment which attaches to criminal trials.36 Proponents 
of open access to criminal proceedings argue that it is essential to directing 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Pierre H. Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right Direction: Ohio’s 
Framework for Sealing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 597 (2005) (citing Margaret 
Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model 
Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1726 (2003)) (stating that employers have legitimate 
reasons to want to know about certain past convictions of prospective employees in particular 
types of jobs); Mayfield, supra note 5, at 1069–70 (arguing that an inability to access criminal 
records may frustrate employers’ attempts to prevent employee theft and to foster safe working 
conditions). 
 33 See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(6)–(32) (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015) (permit-
ting various governmental agencies and private actors such as providers of elder care, youth care, 
and housing to access sealed records); MO. ANN. STAT. § 610.120(1) (Vernon, Westlaw through 
2015 Veto Sess.) (authorizing dissemination of expunged records to certain entities, including 
those that provide child or elderly care and security or private investigative services); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 179A.100(7) (Michie, Lexis through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring mandatory disclosure of 
criminal records to certain governmental agencies and entities such as the State Board of Nursing 
and State Gaming Control Board). In Massachusetts, for example, housing authorities can access 
sealed records in order to evaluate applications and further the “protection and well-being” of 
existing tenants. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(7). 
34 See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 12 (commenting on how there has historically been a “gener-
ally accepted notion that the First Amendment contemplated public access to the criminal justice 
system”); Matthew D. Callanan, Note, Protecting the Unconvicted: Limiting Iowa’s Rights to 
Public Access in Search of Greater Protection for Criminal Defendants Whose Charges Do Not 
End in Convictions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1290–91 (2013) (explaining that open access to court 
proceedings is a longstanding and protected aspect of the American legal system). 
 35 See Newsday LLC v. County of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 163–65 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming 
that there is a presumptive right of access to court proceedings and records under the First 
Amendment that must be considered when courts are asked to seal documents); Commonwealth v. 
Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 1258, 1260 (Mass. 1995) (citing In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 
52 (1st Cir. 1984)) (noting that an individual’s interest in privacy with respect to court records 
may not be reconcilable with the presumption of open access under the First Amendment). 
 36 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980); see also News-
day, 730 F.3d at 163 (“The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment presumptive right 
of access applies to all criminal trials.”). 
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scrutiny at the criminal justice system in order to ensure its fairness and ef-
ficiency.37 
Finally, some opponents of criminal record sealing question the effica-
cy of judicially sealing a criminal record of a conviction or an arrest when 
such information is often publically available and easily accessible.38 With 
the proliferation of searchable court databases, court records relating to 
criminal proceedings are increasingly available over the Internet.39 Further, 
some private companies facilitate online criminal background checks, cir-
cumventing the need to turn to the court or a governmental agency to access 
an individual’s criminal records.40 In light of these realities, some argue that 
governmental efforts to seal and expunge records are ineffective, as court-
ordered or statutorily-authorized sealing or expungement only extends to 
official records retained by governmental agencies.41 
One prevalent argument in favor of criminal record sealing is the need 
to provide economic and social opportunities to ex-offenders in order to 
facilitate reintegration with society.42 Among other collateral consequences, 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, 819 F. Supp. 89, 90–91, 93 (D. Mass. 1993) (citing 
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)) (stating the First Amendment pre-
sumption of openness promotes judicial transparency and accountability); Bergeron & Eberwine, 
supra note 32, at 606 (arguing that open access to court proceedings and records encourages the 
proper functioning of courts and the government more generally). 
 38 See Michael H. Jagunic, Note, The Unified “Sealed” Theory: Updating Ohio’s Record-
Sealing Statute for the Twenty-First Century, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 161, 170–72 (2011) (noting 
the rise in searchable criminal history databases and employers’ use of these databases for hiring 
decisions); Wurie, supra note 24, at 34 (pointing out the argument that searchable online databases 
of criminal records diminish the efficacy of record sealing or expungement); see also Pon, 14 
N.E.3d at 201 (noting that significant media attention on a particular case may be a factor that 
reduces an argument in favor of sealing a criminal record). 
 39 See James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of Crimi-
nal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 183 (2008); Jagunic, supra note 38, at 163 
(stating that 75% of counties in Ohio provide online access to criminal court records). 
 40 See Geffen & Letze, supra note 4, at 1343 (discussing how easy to obtain, online criminal 
records have had a significant impact on housing and employment determinations); Jacobs & 
Crepet, supra note 39, at 185–86 (describing the prevalence of online background check compa-
nies and the large volumes of criminal background checks they perform); Love, supra note 8, at 
17, 19 (commenting on how employers are increasingly relying on inexpensive and easy to obtain 
records from online background check providers). 
 41 See Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 123, 123–24 (2010) (describing the inability to expunge criminal rec-
ords when they are retained by a non-governmental agency); Love, supra note 32, at 1726; May-
field, supra note 5, at 1068–69 (noting that unofficial “records” of alleged criminal conduct exist 
in the form of newspaper articles, police blotters, and witness accounts). 
42 See GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 2 (commenting that the widespread availability of criminal 
records has a detrimental impact on ex-offenders and their families); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 36 (arguing that increased access to criminal record sealing and expungement would 
promote greater educational and economic opportunity for ex-offenders); see also Collateral Con-
sequences of Criminal Convictions, supra note 8, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Scott, Member, H. 
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a criminal record can be a serious impediment to obtaining housing and 
gainful employment.43 Proponents of criminal record sealing argue that lim-
iting the dissemination of criminal record information is not only merciful, 
but is also a pragmatic solution to help curb the problem of rising prison 
populations.44 
Additionally, there is a fairness-based argument in favor of concealing 
criminal record information for individuals who were found to be not guilty 
or who were never prosecuted in a court of law.45 Even where involvement 
in the criminal justice system results in a non-conviction, such as in the case 
of a dismissal or nolle prosequi, an individual may be left with an arrest 
record that may later appear on background checks.46 
Supporters of criminal record sealing also argue that public access to 
criminal records does not necessarily increase public safety and well-being.47 
                                                                                                                           
Comm. on the Judiciary) (describing how a criminal record can act as a serious impediment to 
gaining meaningful employment). 
 43 See Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1261 (stating that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and 
many other courts have acknowledged that arrest and conviction records carry a risk of harm to 
individuals seeking social, educational, and employment opportunities); Victoria R. Kelleher, 
Collateral Consequences, in MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, TRYING DRUG 
CASES IN MASSACHUSETTS § 15.4 (2010) (commenting on the markedly adverse impact of a 
criminal record on attempts to gain employment); Silva, supra note 7, at 205 (emphasizing how 
criminal convictions often lead to a variety of collateral consequences that remain after the com-
pletion of a term of imprisonment or period of probation); DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1066–67 
(describing how empirical research has shown that private employers are less likely to hire some-
one if that individual has a criminal record). 
 44 See Mouzon, supra note 5, at 7, 9–10, 13 (noting that over five hundred thousand prisoners 
are released from prison every year and that expungement represents a practical and direct solu-
tion for mitigating the difficulties associated with this transition); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 9, 36 (arguing that increased access to sealing can help facilitate the reentry of ex-
offenders through the reduction of collateral consequences associated with convictions); see also 
GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 4, 28 (remarking that allowing expungement of criminal records after 
a waiting period is a sound and just way to balance concerns of individual welfare and public 
safety). 
 45 See Geffen & Letze, supra note 4, at 1347–48 (pointing out how criminal records contain-
ing only non-conviction data are routinely used against individuals while seeking housing or em-
ployment); Callanan, supra note 34, at 1278 (arguing that placing limitations on the access of 
criminal records for individuals who have not been convicted is consistent with the legal principle 
in the United States that individuals are innocent until proven guilty). 
 46 See James Gempeler, Expungement Revisited: Minnesota’s New Second Chance Law, 71 
BENCH & B. MINN. 14, 15 (2014) (explaining that criminal records often consist of data beyond a 
particular conviction and disposition and may include details of the arrest and data collected by 
police and other governmental agencies); Love, supra note 8, at 17 (explaining that even arrest 
records can “derail” employment opportunities). Black’s Law Dictionary defines nolle prosequi as 
“[a] legal notice that a lawsuit or prosecution has been abandoned.” Nolle prosequi, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 47 See Geffen & Letze, supra note 4, at 1341 (arguing that allowing for the expungement of 
records facilitates socially-desirable behavior in individuals which in turn increases public safety); 
DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1065–67 (commenting that increased employment is strongly corre-
lated with increased public safety and decreased criminal activity).  
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Due to a lack of economic opportunity associated with having a criminal rec-
ord, certain ex-offenders choose to resume criminal conduct.48 In turn, the 
proliferation of and easy access to criminal record databases may serve to 
prevent ex-offenders from obtaining the opportunity to demonstrate meaning-
ful personal change and to break the cycle of recidivism.49  
B. A Series of Legislative Failures at the Federal Level 
A relatively uniform approach to criminal record sealing or expunge-
ment has remained elusive for defendants convicted of federal offenses.50 
For over a decade, numerous congressional attempts to introduce a broad 
and generally available criminal record sealing or expungement remedy 
have failed, leaving equitable expungement by federal courts as the sole 
remedy available for individuals seeking sealing or expungement at the fed-
eral level.51 Even among courts that have held that the judiciary possesses 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Mouzon, supra note 5, at 4, 7 (remarking on the role that collateral consequences of 
criminal convictions play in the recidivism of ex-offenders); DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1065–66 
(noting that criminal records substantially interfere with ex-offenders’ ability to gain employment 
and that higher employment rates are correlated with increased public safety). 
 49 See Jacobs, supra note 39, at 178–79 (suggesting that increased criminal behavior may be a 
tragic and unintended consequence of increased access to criminal record databases); Mouzon, 
supra note 5, at 2–3 (arguing that the availability of criminal record information can be “counter-
productive” in that it prevents individuals from showing that they have made steps towards reha-
bilitation). Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick cited the facilitation of opportunity for ex-
offenders as an essential aspect of preventing crime and ensuring public safety. See Paul McMor-
row, Patrick Urges Passage of CORI Reform Bill, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 19, 2008), http://www.
boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/03/19/patrick_urges_passage_of_cori_reform_bill/ [https://
perma.cc/DQ56-RNRL]. 
 50 See Raj Mukherji, Note, In Search of Redemption: Expungement of Federal Criminal Rec-
ords 2 (Law Sch. Student Scholarship, Paper 163, 2013), http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1163&context=student_scholarship [https://perma.cc/2YUU-WRJ3] (stating 
that there is no generally applicable statute allowing expungement of criminal records at the feder-
al level); Expungement, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/expungement [https://
perma.cc/D8N8-L9DY] [hereinafter ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR.] (commenting that there is no 
general federal statutory provision authorizing criminal record sealing or expungement); infra note 
51 and accompanying text (describing how a circuit split exists as to whether or not to allow equi-
table expungement of criminal records). 
 51 See Silva, supra note 7, at 186–87 (explaining that several federal court jurisdictions have 
determined that courts have an inherent power to allow expungement of criminal records in certain 
instances); Mukherji, supra note 50, at 46 (describing how Congress has yet to enact any broadly 
applicable statute that provides criminal record sealing or expungement relief). Currently, there is 
a split among the U.S. Courts of Appeals Circuit Courts as to whether federal courts can expunge 
federal criminal records on equitable grounds through the exercise of inherent judicial powers. See 
Mouzon, supra note 5, at 23–24 (explaining that inherent powers are seen as powers of the federal 
court which allow the courts to commit actions “necessary to effect justice”); Silva, supra note 7, 
at 186–87. On one hand, the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that federal courts 
do not have the jurisdiction to expunge criminal records on equitable grounds alone. See United 
States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178–
79 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 859–60, 862 (8th Cir. 2006); United 
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the authority to expunge criminal records, this power is understood as lim-
ited and only available in rare circumstances.52  
Thus far, legislative efforts to create a broad federal approach to crimi-
nal record sealing or expungement have been repeatedly killed or aban-
doned.53 In 2000, U.S. Congressman Charlie Rangel introduced the Second-
Chance for Ex-Offenders Act, which would have allowed for the expunge-
ment of criminal records for individuals who had never committed a violent 
felony or misdemeanor.54 After the bill failed to pass the House of Repre-
sentatives, Congressman Rangel continued to reintroduce it in subsequent 
legislative sessions, but each effort was in vain.55 Similarly, the Fresh Start 
                                                                                                                           
States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1013–15 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ritesh Patel, Hall v. Alabama: 
Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction to Expunge Criminal Records?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 
401, 401 (2010) (commenting on how the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have decided 
that they do not have jurisdiction to expunge criminal records). On the other hand, the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have decided that inherent judicial powers author-
ize granting expungement requests for equitable reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Flowers, 389 
F.3d 737, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Livingston v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States v. Schnitzer, 
567 F.2d 536, 539–40 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Wurie, supra note 24, at 46 & n.93 (listing the 
decisions of the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits that have claimed proper 
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records).  
 52 See Flowers, 389 F.3d at 739 (declaring it evident that the interest of the individual very 
rarely outweighs the interests of the public in such a way that calls for equitable expungement); 
Pinto, 1 F.3d at 1070 (explaining that expungement through equitable powers only occurs in “ex-
treme circumstances”); George Blum et al., Court’s Authority to Order Expungement, in 21 AM. 
JUR. 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 1220 (2014) (explaining that judicial expungement is typically reserved 
for “unusual or extreme cases” and is not used to deal with issues such as arrest records in cases 
where an individual is not convicted). Accordingly, even if the circuit split were to be resolved in 
favor of uniform equitable expungement, the majority of arrestees or ex-offenders would be un-
likely to benefit from this change due to the high burden placed on individuals to demonstrate that 
his or her record should be expunged and the presumption of the courts that such a remedy is for 
rare and extreme circumstances. See Silva, supra note 7, at 187–88 (commenting that obtaining a 
judicial expungement on grounds of equity requires a showing of “exceptional hardship” or that 
expungement is called for under the “application of fairness and justice”). 
 53 See Mouzon, supra note 5, at 13, 36; Mukherji, supra note 50, at 41, 42; infra notes 54–60 
and accompanying text; see also ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 50 (describing how there 
is no broadly-applicable statute regarding sealing or expungement at the federal level). A couple 
of targeted and limited expungement statutes have been passed by Congress. See Wurie, supra 
note 24, at 42–44; Mukherji, supra note 50, at 26–27. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 3607, Con-
gress authorized the federal courts to expunge the records of individuals who successfully com-
plete a period of probation for certain minor drug possession crimes and have their cases dis-
missed. 18 U.S.C. § 3607 (2012); see Wurie, supra note 24, at 43. 
 54 See H.R. 5433, 106th Cong. §§ 3361–3362 (2d Sess. 2000). In addition to never having 
committed a violent crime, individuals seeking expungement had to remain free of substance 
abuse for at least one year, complete high school or a GED program, and complete at least one 
year of community service. See id. § 3362. 
 55 See H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 623, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 
662, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); H.R. 1434, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003); Mouzon, supra note 
5, at 36 & n.146. In 2005, minor changes were made such as limiting application of the bill to 
first-time, non-violent offenders. See H.R. 662 §§ 3632–3633. 
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Act of 2011, introduced by Congressman Steve Cohen, would have allowed 
for the expungement of particular non-violent criminal records for first-time 
offenders, but it too failed to be enacted.56 
Legislative efforts to provide broader access to criminal record sealing 
or expungement at the federal level have continued to be introduced.57 In 
March 2015, Senators Rand Paul and Cory Booker introduced the Record 
Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment Act of 2015 or “RE-
DEEM Act,” a bill that seeks to allow criminal record sealing for certain 
non-violent offenders.58 The bill would allow individuals to petition to seal 
records of non-violent federal offenses, provided that the petitioner has not 
been convicted of more than two “covered” felonies or convicted of one 
“non-covered” felony, such as a crime of violence or a sex offense.59 The 
bill outlined a multifactor test that courts would use to determine whether to 
seal a criminal record, balancing the interests of the public, any legitimate 
governmental concerns about sealing criminal record information, the inter-
ests of the petitioner in making the information private, and the demonstrat-
ed efforts of the petitioner at rehabilitation.60  
C. The Disparate Approach to Sealing and Expungement  
at the State Level 
Among the states, material differences exist between the procedures, 
eligibility requirements, and timeframes for sealing or expunging criminal 
records.61 In addition to the terminology used, states differ as to the amount 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). The bill also failed to pass the House of Rep-
resentatives when it was reintroduced in 2013. See H.R. 3014, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 57 See S. 675, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); H.R. 1672, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); S. 
2567, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); H.R. 5158, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014); H.R. 3014. 
 58 See S. 675. 
 59 See id. § 3631. Individuals would be eligible to petition for sealing one year after a convic-
tion and the day of the disposition for a non-conviction. See id. § 3632(a)(2). 
 60 See id. § 3632(b)(3). Although sealing would not be automatic, the bill would open up 
eligibility to a large range of individuals with conviction and arrest histories to have their records 
sealed. See Press Release, Senator Rand Paul, Sens. Paul and Booker Introduce Criminal Justice 
Reform Legislation (July 8, 2014), https://votesmart.org/public-statement/893522/sens-paul-and-
booker-introduce-criminal-justice-reform-legislation#.VpU7fvkrIgs [https://perma.cc/VYB5-8XJ4]. 
In addition to criminal record sealing for adults, the bill also seeks to provide automatic expunge-
ment of juvenile records for children under fifteen years old, automatic sealing for children over 
fifteen years old, offer incentives for states to raise the minimum age for criminal responsibility to 
eighteen years old, remove restrictions on government welfare for certain drug offenders, and 
place limitations on the use of solitary confinement for juveniles. See id. 
 61 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (allowing individu-
als convicted of misdemeanors to file for expungement five years from the date the individual 
completes their sentence or period of probation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A)(1) (West 
Supp. 2015) (authorizing individuals to apply to have their records sealed after one year following 
final discharge for a misdemeanor conviction and after three years following final discharge for a 
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of discretion inherent in the decision to allow or deny a petition for sealing 
or expungement.62  
In many states, judges are tasked with making sealing or expungement 
decisions, often through consideration of discretionary factors such as the 
individual’s interest in privacy, the individual’s demonstrated change in 
conduct or rehabilitation, and the general interest of the public in keeping 
the record open to promote public safety.63 In New York, the burden is on 
district attorneys to argue that sealing a non-conviction record is contrary to 
the public interest.64  
Other states, however, have opted to allow for automatic sealing or ex-
pungement of certain records.65 “Automatic” sealing or expungement means 
either that records are sealed or expunged by default following certain dis-
positions or that individuals are allowed to file a petition to seal or expunge 
that will automatically be accepted if certain statutory factors are satisfied.66 
                                                                                                                           
felony conviction); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.2(A) (Supp. 2015) (allowing expungement of 
police and court records for any individual whose criminal charges result in acquittal, nolle prose-
qui, or dismissal); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.060 (2014) (permitting individuals to request that 
certain “non-conviction” data, such as a record of an arrest, to be “deleted” from a criminal rec-
ord). 
62 Silva, supra note 7, at 191–95 (noting the different degrees of discretion built into the seal-
ing or expungement systems in Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut); DeJarnatt, supra note 
26, at 1051 (describing how states endow their respective courts with varying degrees of discre-
tion to make sealing or expungement determinations); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2, 
34 (commenting on how many recent state level reforms gave discretionary authority to judges, 
prosecutors, or both). 
 63 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(5) (Lexis through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (instruct-
ing courts to balance the interests of the ex-offender with the “best interests of justice and public 
safety” when deciding whether to allow the expungement of certain eligible felony offenses); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-107(8)(d) (Supp. 2015) (instructing judges only to grant petitions for 
expungement if the requests are not “contrary to the interests of the public”). In Vermont, for 
example, judges considering whether to allow a motion for sealing or expungement are instructed 
to consider whether granting a petition is in accordance with the interests of justice. See VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13 § 7602(b)(1)(D) (2015). Similarly, in Missouri, the statute governing expungement 
states that judges should consider whether the “circumstances and behavior” of the petitioner 
suggest that expungement is proper and whether the request is “consistent with the public wel-
fare.” See MO. REV. STAT. § 610.140.5(4)–(5) (Supp. 2013). 
 64 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50(1), (3) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2015, ch. 
589). 
 65 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4373(a) (Supp. 2014) (mandating expungement of 
misdemeanor records for first offenders who are not convicted of the offense for which they seek 
expungement); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2014) (allowing automatic record sealing 
upon petition for most misdemeanors and felony offenses after certain waiting periods); TEX. 
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (West Supp. 2015) (stating that automatic “expunction” is 
available for certain individuals charged with, but not convicted of, a criminal offense); see also 
DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1051 (noting that several states allow for automatic sealing or ex-
pungement, but the majority do not). 
66 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(a) (2013) (ordering automatic erasure of police and 
court records when a criminal defendant is found not guilty), and MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, 
§ 100C para. 1 (2014) (instructing the clerk and commissioner of probation to automatically seal 
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In Connecticut, for example, courts automatically order the “erasure” of 
records of acquittals, dismissals, nolle prosequis, and cases continued with-
out prosecution for thirteen months.67  
Jurisdictions also differ as to which offenses and dispositions are eligi-
ble for sealing or expungement.68 Most states offer some form of sealing or 
expungement for non-conviction records, but are more restrictive or prohib-
itive for sealing conviction records, especially for felonies.69 In Missouri, 
for example, arrest records that are disposed of in favor of the defendant 
may be sealed and a narrow range of misdemeanor offenses can be ex-
punged.70 In Mississippi, expungement is only available for non-conviction 
records and a small category of misdemeanors.71 Some states have provi-
sions that allow for sealing or expungement for certain categories of first 
time offenders who successfully complete a period of probation or diversion 
                                                                                                                           
records of criminal cases where there is an acquittal, there has been no indictment by a grand jury, 
or where the court has not found probable cause), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (allow-
ing individuals to petition to have conviction records sealed and instructing the commissioner of 
probation to automatically allow these petitions provided certain statutory eligibility factors are 
satisfied). Advocates of automatic sealing argue that it contributes to more equitable outcomes and 
helps reduce expense and potential confusion for individuals seeking sealing or expungement. See 
GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 24, 29 (commenting that automatic expungement helps reduce delays, 
confusion, and expense involved in petitioning the court and arguing for relief at a hearing); David L. 
Warnock & William H. Murphy, Commentary, No Conviction? Erase the Record, BALT. SUN (Aug. 
13, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-13/news/bs-ed-expungements-20140813_1_
expungement-public-record-city-district-court [https://perma.cc/U38R-WG2S] (arguing that non-
conviction records should be expunged automatically due the cost and confusion of having to 
petition to have a record expunged).  
 67 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(a)–(c). “Erasure,” as used in the statute, does not refer to 
the physical destruction of records, but rather to the act of sealing the records and keeping them 
from public view. See Doe v. Manson, 438 A.2d 859, 861 (Conn. 1981).  
 68 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180(b) (2014) (permitting criminal records to be sealed 
only when petitioner shows beyond a reasonable doubt that a conviction was the product of false 
accusation or mistaken identity); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-3004(10) (2014) (authorizing only the 
expungement of non-conviction records for individuals who were not charged within one year of 
arrest or summons or who were acquitted); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 
2015) (allowing individuals to petition to expunge misdemeanor offenses, but not felonies); 12 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2(a) (Supp. 2015) (authorizing first-time, non-violent offenders to ex-
punge a misdemeanor or felony). 
 69 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078(1) (allowing the possibility to seal only misde-
meanors and not felonies); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 978 (Supp. 2015) (allowing individu-
als to petition to expunge only one felony offense, with exceptions, following a ten-year waiting 
period); see also Mouzon, supra note 5, at 32–34 (explaining that many states permit expunge-
ment of misdemeanor convictions and a narrower group of states allow for expungement of felony 
convictions). 
 70 See MO. REV. STAT. § 610.105(1) (Supp. 2013) (providing for the closure of records in 
cases that end favorably for the defendant); id. § 610.140.2(1)–(2) (allowing for expungement of a 
select type of misdemeanor and felony offenses). The offenses that are eligible to be expunged 
include first time offenses for fraudulent credit card use, passing a bad check, disturbing the peace, 
negligent burning of debris, and gambling. See id. § 610.140.2(2). 
 71 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-71(1)–(2)(a) (2015). 
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program.72 In certain states, however, even sealing or expunging non-
conviction data remains a significant challenge or a completely unavailable 
option.73 
Finally, the amount of time that an individual must wait in order to be el-
igible to petition to seal or expunge a particular type of criminal record or 
offense depends on the statutory schema of the state in which they are seeking 
the remedy.74 In Massachusetts, for example, individuals can seek to seal non-
conviction records immediately, but must wait five years to petition to seal a 
misdemeanor conviction and ten years to petition to seal a felony convic-
tion.75 In Nevada, the waiting period for both felonies and misdemeanors de-
pends on the type and severity of the offense.76 For example, gross misde-
meanors are eligible for sealing after five years whereas ordinary misde-
meanors are eligible for sealing after only two years.77 Similarly, timelines for 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 712-1255(1)–(2), 712-1256(1) (Michie, Lexis through 
2015 Legis. Sess.) (allowing first time drug offenders under the age of twenty to have their records 
expunged after successfully completing a term of probation and having their case dismissed); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-145(a) (Lexis through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (allowing individuals who committed 
misdemeanors while under the age of eighteen or alcohol-related misdemeanors while under the 
age of twenty-one to petition for expunction of their record following a waiting period); 12 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2 (allowing non-violent first offenders to have misdemeanor or felony con-
victions expunged after a waiting period); see also Silva, supra note 7, at 158 (remarking that as 
of 2010, seventeen states had pathways for sealing or expunging “first and minor offenses”). 
 73 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051(A) (Supp. 2015) (authorizing only individuals 
who have been “wrongfully” arrested to petition court for a notation indicating that they have been 
cleared of a charge); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8(a)–(b) (West Supp. 2015) (allowing expungement 
of an arrest record only where no accusatory pleading has been filed or where an individual peti-
tions a court for a determination that they are in fact innocent in spite of the filing of an accusatory 
pleading); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-3-8.1(A) (Supp. 2013) (permitting expungement of arrest in-
formation only for misdemeanors that were not crimes of moral turpitude). 
 74 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1405(a), 16-90-1406 (Supp. 2015) (allowing individ-
uals to petition to seal records after sixty days in the case of a misdemeanor and five years in the 
case of an eligible, first felony offense); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A)(1) (West Supp. 
2015) (permitting individuals to seek to seal their records one year after their sentence is completed 
for a misdemeanor conviction and three years after their sentence is completed for an eligible felony 
conviction); GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 28 (describing how states allow for the possibility of 
sealing generally only after a certain waiting period since the offense or conviction occurred). 
 75 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 100A, 100C (2015). In Utah, most non-conviction rec-
ords are eligible to be sealed after thirty days whereas conviction records involve waiting periods 
between three to ten years after the end of a sentence depending on the severity and classification 
of the offense. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-40-104(1), 77-40-105(3) (LexisNexis 2012 & Supp. 
2015). For example, individuals must wait ten years to expunge a conviction of negligent motor 
vehicle homicide involving alcohol or drugs, seven years to expunge a felony, and three to five 
years to expunge a misdemeanor depending on its classification. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-
8(2)(g), 77-40-105(3) (LexisNexis 2015). 
 76 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245 (Michie, Lexis through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (outlining 
the various sealing timeframes that differ according to the severity and classification of the under-
lying criminal offense). 
 77 See id. § 179.245(1)(d), (1)(f). According to Nevada statute, a “misdemeanor” is a crime 
punishable by a fine up to $1000 or incarceration of up to six months in a county jail. See id. 
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sealing felonies depend on the classification of the offense, with waiting peri-
ods of fifteen years for category A or B felonies, twelve years for category C 
or D felonies, and seven years for category E felonies.78 
II. THE EVOLVING LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL APPROACH TO CRIMINAL 
RECORD SEALING IN MASSACHUSETTS 
Over the years, Massachusetts has developed a comprehensive system 
for criminal record management and sealing.79 Under the Massachusetts 
schema, individuals can seek to seal records of acquittals, nolle prosequis, 
dismissals, and convictions for misdemeanor and felony offenses.80 In re-
cent years, however, the availability and implications of criminal record 
sealing have changed dramatically in Massachusetts.81 Section A will dis-
cuss the creation and evolution of Massachusetts’s criminal record man-
agement system.82 Section B will examine the sealing of conviction data 
                                                                                                                           
§ 193.120(3). A “gross misdemeanor” is every other criminal offense short of a felony, which is a 
crime that can lead to the death penalty or incarceration in state prison. See id. § 193.120(2), (4). 
 78 See id. § 179.245(1)(a)–(c). The particular category for a felony in Nevada depends on the 
possible punishment for the offense. See id. § 193.130(2). Category A felonies involve sentences 
of life in prison or the death penalty, whereas category E felonies involve state prison sentences of 
not less than one year and not more than four years in state prison. See id. § 193.130(2)(a), (e). 
 79 See Commonwealth v. Balboni, 642 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1994) (quoting Common-
wealth v. Vickey, 412 N.E.2d 877, 883 (Mass. 1980)) (stating that the Massachusetts legislature 
provided a clear framework for criminal record sealing that should not be enlarged by the courts); 
PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5, 11 (describing the historical development and current schema 
for criminal record management and sealing in Massachusetts). In Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has repeatedly found that judges generally do not have the authority to order the 
expungement of criminal records. See Commonwealth v. Alves, 15 N.E.3d 247, 247, 249–51 
(Mass. 2014) (explaining that sealing is the applicable remedy in Massachusetts that will be ap-
plied in “all but the most exceptional circumstances”); Commonwealth v. Moe, 974 N.E.2d 619, 
621, 624 (Mass. 2012) (stating that expungement is not available because sealing is the “sole rem-
edy” under the applicable statute); Commonwealth v. Boe, 924 N.E.2d 239, 244, 247 (Mass. 
2010) (finding that since the legislature did not statutorily provide for the option of expungement 
in the sealing statute, it should not be judicially created by the courts). In 1994, in Commonwealth 
v. Balboni, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts explained that although fundamentally 
different, sealing and expungement offer the same relief of “ensuring the confidentiality” of an 
individual’s criminal record. See 642 N.E.2d at 577–78. An exception to this restriction on ex-
pungement of records is in cases where an individual is wrongfully convicted of a felony offense 
and subsequently receives a gubernatorial pardon or other judicial relief “on grounds which tend 
to establish the innocence of the individual.” See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1, 7(A) (2014). 
 80 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, §§ 100A, 100C (2014). 
 81 See Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182, 190–91, 193 (Mass. 2014) (providing an over-
view of the 2010 reforms to the Criminal Offender Record Information (“CORI”) system); 
Massing, supra note 12, at 24 (commenting that the central goals of CORI reform were to stream-
line and add clarity to the process of obtaining criminal records, while at the same time providing 
greater opportunity for ex-offenders); infra notes 95–112, 137–153 accompanying text (examining 
the judicial and legislative changes to the CORI system beginning in 2010). 
82 See infra notes 85–112 and accompanying text.  
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under the Massachusetts criminal record sealing statute.83 Finally, section C 
will discuss the sealing of non-conviction data following the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court’s 2014 decision in Commonwealth v. Pon.84  
A. The Criminal Offender Record Information System 
In 1972, the Massachusetts legislature passed the Criminal Offender 
Record Information Act (“CORI Act” or “the Act”), which established the 
Criminal Offender Record Information (“CORI”) system.85 The CORI Act 
was part of an effort to centralize the collection, dissemination, and sealing 
of criminal record information or CORI reports in Massachusetts.86 The Act 
was also a pioneering piece of legislation in that it was the first state-level 
effort to create a cohesive and unified management system for all criminal 
record information.87 After years of debate and gradual modifications, the 
CORI system was significantly overhauled in 2010 in order to balance pri-
vate and public interests surrounding the sealing of criminal records.88 
1. The Passage of the Act and Its Original Intentions 
The original CORI system rigorously limited access to criminal rec-
ords.89 In order to manage the proper restriction of criminal record data, the 
CORI Act authorized the creation of the Criminal History Systems Board 
                                                                                                                           
83 See infra notes 113–120 and accompanying text.  
84 See infra notes 121–153 and accompanying text. 
 85 See 1972 Mass. Acts 813–20; Gilbert, supra note 31, at 12. The CORI system is a central-
ized, state-run database of criminal record information that is governed by the Department of 
Criminal Justice Information Services (“DCJIS”). See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 167 (2014); 
Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.1. 
 86 See 1972 Mass. Acts 814–15; PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. A CORI report is a record 
of an individual’s formal involvement in the Massachusetts criminal justice system from arrest 
through the completion of a sentence. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 167; Pangonis, supra note 
26, § 18.1. 
 87 See Jonathan Brant et al., Public Records, FIPA and CORI: How Massachusetts Balances 
Privacy and the Right to Know, 15 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 23, 57–58 (1981) (explaining that Massa-
chusetts developed a centralized system for criminal record management to “establish minimum 
security and privacy safeguards for all criminal offender record information”); Gilbert, supra note 
31, at 12 (describing Massachusetts’s role as a pioneer in creating a centralized system to control 
the management and dissemination of criminal records). 
 88 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172 (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015); PRIEST ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 5 (explaining that the 2010 CORI Reform Act included major changes to the way crim-
inal record information was stored, accessed, and disseminated in Massachusetts); Massing, supra 
note 12, at 21 (commenting on how both “employers and advocates for ex-offenders alike” agreed 
that the CORI system needed to be changed prior to the 2010 legislation). 
 89 See 1972 Mass. Acts 817–18; Georgia K. Cristley & Agapi Koulouris, What Access Do 
Employers Have to CORI?, in MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, MASSACHU-
SETTS CRIMINAL OFFENDER RECORD INFORMATION (CORI) LAW § 2.1 (2013) (describing the 
strict limitations on access and dissemination of criminal records). 
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(“CHSB”) and gave it the power to determine who, when, and how criminal 
record information could be released and accessed.90 Under section 172, 
CORI reports were only allowed to be given to criminal justice agencies 
and other agencies and actors that were specifically authorized by statute.91 
Although some championed the 1972 CORI Act as a vital tool for se-
curing privacy and providing opportunity to ex-offenders, others, including 
landlords, employers, and victims’ rights advocates, viewed the Act’s ex-
tremely restrictive approach to allowing access to criminal record infor-
mation as problematic.92 In the years following its passage, a number of 
legislative actions and judicial challenges began to influence the discussion 
about the CORI system and how publicly available criminal record infor-
mation should be.93 In turn, the legislature modified and slightly relaxed the 
stringent limitations on access envisioned by the CORI Act in the decades 
that followed the Act’s passage.94 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See 1972 Mass. Acts 814–15; Gilbert, supra note 31, at 12. This centralized body was com-
posed of a variety of law enforcement and judicial authorities, including the Attorney General, 
Chairman of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, the Chairman of the Parole Board, the Com-
missioner of the Department of Correction, the Police Commissioner of the City of Boston, and the 
Chief Justices of the District, Superior, and Supreme Judicial Courts. See 1972 Mass. Acts 814–15. 
 91 See 1972 Mass. Acts 817–18. 
 92 See Brant et al., supra note 87, at 65–66 (explaining that the CORI Act placed “significant 
limitations” on access to criminal record information); Gilbert, supra note 31, at 12 (describing 
how groups such as employers, victim advocacy groups, and politicians began to voice “growing 
dissatisfaction” with the stifling impact on access to criminal record information inherent in the 
CORI system); Massing, supra note 12, at 21–22 (commenting on the tension between advocates 
in favor of personal privacy and members of the business community who wanted greater access 
to criminal record information); Kenneth J. Botty, CORI Reform Bill Failure Is a Loss for Mass. 
Public, WORCESTER TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 1990, at C2, 1990 WLNR 4143704 (argu-
ing that the CORI Act jeopardized public safety by giving too much privacy protection to ex-
offenders). 
 93 See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 12; PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. Despite several judi-
cial challenges to the CORI Act, the courts did little to interfere with the restrictions to access that 
the Act established. See Brant et al., supra note 87, at 72 (commenting that in the decade follow-
ing the passage of the CORI Act, the Massachusetts courts were deferential to the aims of privacy 
and limitation on access of information that the legislature established). One relatively minor judi-
cial pushback against the CORI Act came in 1993, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton, when the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the Act’s restriction on obtaining and dis-
closing alphabetical indices of criminal court cases violated the First Amendment. See 819 F. Supp. 
89, 91, 98–99 (D. Mass. 1993). In spite of this holding, the court expressly declined to consider 
broader challenges to the constitutionality of the CORI Act’s other restrictions on the use and availa-
bility of criminal record information. See id. at 100. 
 94 See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 22; Martin W. Healy, Commentary: Healy on the Hill, MASS. 
LAW. WKLY., June 12, 2006, at 6, 2006 WLNR 27169451 (noting that multiple legislative reforms 
to the CORI Act focused on addressing the unavailability of criminal record information). In 1977, 
the CORI Act was amended to include dissemination of criminal records to individuals and agencies 
when such access was in accordance with the public interest. See Brant et al., supra note 87, at 66. 
Despite this new route to obtaining access to criminal record information, it was the burden of the 
individual seeking access to prove his or her request comported with the interests of the public. 
See Gilbert, supra note 31, at 13. In 1990, an amendment required that criminal history information 
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2. The 2010 CORI Reform 
In response to longstanding debate over the proper operation of the 
CORI system, Governor Deval Patrick sought to introduce reforms that 
would increase the public availability of criminal record information while 
simultaneously introducing procedural protections to promote opportunity 
and facilitate reintegration for ex-offenders.95 In 2010, the Massachusetts 
legislature passed the CORI Reform Act, a piece of legislation which made 
numerous changes to the way that CORIs are accessed, disseminated, and 
sealed.96 
One major aspect of the Act was to broaden access to criminal records 
for employers, housing providers, and certain governmental and non-
governmental agencies through the implementation of a digitized database 
called iCORI.97 Under the revised statute, employers and landlords can ob-
tain “Standard Access” that enables them to obtain CORI reports for the 
purposes of evaluating candidates for employment, housing, volunteer op-
portunities, and professional or occupational licensure.98 For these private 
                                                                                                                           
be publicly accessible for a short amount of time following the release of an offender from custody or 
incarceration. See id. at 22. In that same year, public housing authorities were authorized to access 
CORI for screening of prospective tenants in order to ensure the continued safety of existing tenants. 
See CLAIRE KAPLAN, THE BOS. FOUND., CORI: BALANCING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND PUBLIC 
ACCESS, 8 (2005), www.crj.org/page/-/cjifiles/CORIReport_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/S53X-H8X4]. 
In 2002, changes to the CORI Act allowed access to criminal record information for camps and other 
organizations that provided services to children under the age of eighteen. See 2002 Mass. Acts 
1159–60. 
 95 See McMorrow, supra note 49; see also Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 191 (noting that certain agencies 
and entities have legitimate needs to access criminal records); Kelleher, supra note 43, § 15.4 
(describing how the reforms intended to recalibrate the individual’s interest in privacy with the 
need for public safety). 
 96 See An Act Reforming the Administrative Procedures Relative to Criminal Offender Rec-
ord Information, 2010 Mass. Acts ch. 256; PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5. Part of the change 
was to eliminate the Criminal History Systems Board (“CHSB”) and replace it with the DCJIS, an 
agency responsible for the online maintenance and dissemination of CORI reports. See PRIEST ET 
AL., supra note 11, at 5. 
 97 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(3) (authorizing businesses, landlords, and volunteer 
agencies to request certain criminal record information); Margaret H. Paget, Employment, in 
CRIME AND CONSEQUENCE, supra note 26, § 3.2.3 (providing a summary of the iCORI database 
and how employers and housing providers can use it to access criminal record information); John 
S. Gannon, Are You Prepared for CORI Reform?, 23 No. 3 MASS. EMP. L. LETTER 1, 1 (2012) 
(explaining the scope and operation of the iCORI system); Summary of Levels of CORI Access 
with Requestor Types, MASS. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV., http://www.mass.
gov/eopss/agencies/dcjis/summary-of-levels-of-cori-access-with-requestor-types.html [https://perma.
cc/2GR3-3EBY] [hereinafter Levels of CORI Access] (providing an overview of the information 
that can be accessed via the iCORI system for particular requestors). 
 98 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(3); Gannon, supra note 97, at 1. This is in stark 
contrast to the pre-2010 approach to CORIs which limited access to a narrow group of employers 
and government agencies that were statutorily or discretionarily authorized to access CORI re-
ports. See Massing, supra note 12, at 22 (describing how only 5000 private employers were au-
thorized to obtain CORI reports before the 2010 reform). 
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employers and landlords, CORI reports are limited in scope to include felo-
ny convictions within ten years of the disposition of the case, misdemeanor 
convictions within five years of the disposition of the case, and pending 
criminal charges.99 In addition to employers and landlords, the iCORI sys-
tem is available to general and open access by the public with a more lim-
ited availability of criminal record information.100 Additionally, Massachu-
setts adopted a “safe harbor” provision for employers which limits liability 
for negligent hiring decisions made within ninety days of obtaining an offi-
cial CORI report.101 
Certain agencies and entities are statutorily given “Required Access” 
which provides agencies and organizations with more detailed and unfiltered 
CORI reports in comparison to “Standard Access.”102 Entities and organiza-
tions that are provided “Required Access” are further subdivided between 
“Required 1” through “Required 4” levels of access.103 Required 1 Access, 
the lowest required access designation, permits entities such as hospitals, 
banks, and insurance companies to see all unsealed adult and youthful of-
fender convictions, as well as records of pending offenses.104 Required 2 Ac-
                                                                                                                           
 99 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(3). “Standard Access” also includes access to all con-
viction records for murder, manslaughter, and sex offenses regardless of the amount of time since the 
offense has passed if the conviction has not been sealed. Implementing CORI Reform, MASS. DEP’T 
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERV., http://www.mass.gov/eopss/docs/chsb/implementing-cori-reform.
pdf [hereinafter Implementing Cori Reform]. For the purposes of the statute, pending criminal charges 
include continued without a finding (“CWOF”) dispositions that have not yet been dismissed. See 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(3). A CWOF prevents a guilty finding from being entered against 
a defendant and instead provides an opportunity for the defendant to complete a term of probation 
and have the case against them dismissed. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 18 (2014). 
 100 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(4). “Open Access” to the public is limited to: felo-
ny convictions which carry a potential of five or more years in prison provided that the disposition 
occurred within the last ten years, information on the location and custody of any individual cur-
rently incarcerated, on probation, or on parole, any felony conviction within two years of the dis-
position, and any misdemeanor convictions within one year of the disposition. See id. “Open Ac-
cess” also includes access to all conviction records for murder, manslaughter, and sex offenses 
regardless of the amount of time since the offense has passed if the conviction has not been sealed. 
See Implementing Cori Reform, supra note 99. 
 101 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(e); Paget, supra note 97, § 3.2.3. This limited liability 
provision is notably absent when an entity relies on a third-party criminal record service and thus 
promotes use of the more limited iCORI system. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(e); Paget, 
supra note 97, § 3.2.3. 
 102 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(2) (authorizing entities and organizations that are 
required to obtain CORI reports by statute or regulation to obtain sufficient information to satisfy 
their statutory or regulatory obligation); Implementing Cori Reform, supra note 99. 
 103 See Cristley & Koulouris, supra note 89, § 2.2.5 (describing the various levels of “Re-
quired Access”); Implementing Cori Reform, supra note 99. 
 104 See Cristley & Koulouris, supra note 89, § 2.2.6(c) (listing the various entities and organi-
zations that receive Required 1 Access); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97 (providing an 
overview of the types of entities that are statutorily given Required 1 Access and the underlying 
purposes for the access); see also MASS. COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION, MCAD FACT 
SHEET: CRIMINAL OFFENDER RECORD INFORMATION ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORMS 4 
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cess allows organizations such as in-home care providers, day care operators, 
nursing homes, and providers of services to children under eighteen years old 
to view CORI reports containing all adult convictions, youthful offender con-
victions, non-conviction records that have not been sealed, and records of 
pending offenses.105 Required 3 Access allows camps to obtain adult, youth-
ful offender, and juvenile offender convictions, as well as non-conviction rec-
ords and records of pending offenses.106 Finally, Required 4 Access, the high-
est required access designation, allows the Massachusetts Department of Ear-
ly Education to receive all conviction and non-conviction records, as well as 
sealed records and records of pending offenses.107 
Although the CORI Reform Act substantially increased access to crim-
inal records, it also contained a variety of measures designed to offer proce-
dural safeguards and enable reintegration for individuals with criminal rec-
ords.108 First, the CORI Reform Act made it illegal for employers to request 
that prospective employees provide copies of their CORI reports.109 Second, 
the revised statute made it unlawful for employers to inquire about criminal 
histories in preliminary written job applications.110 Third, if an employer or 
                                                                                                                           
(2010), http://www.mass.gov/mcad/resources/employers-businesses/criminal-records-fact-sheet.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AN83-BKLV] (explaining that certain financial institutions are statutorily 
mandated under federal law to inquire as to whether a prospective employee has ever been con-
victed of a crime involving dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering). 
 105 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172C (2014) (giving CORI report access to in-home care 
providers); id. § 172E (allowing dissemination of criminal record information for long term care 
and assisted living facilities); id. § 172H (permitting release of criminal offender information to 
providers of services for children under eighteen years old); Cristley & Koulouris, supra note 89, 
§ 2.2.6(c) (listing the entities and organizations that receive Required 2 Access and detailing the 
specific statutory basis for the access); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97 (listing what entities 
receive Required 2 Access and the purposes for the access). 
 106 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172G (2014); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97. 
 107 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172F (requiring that the Department of Early Education 
and Care receive all conviction and non-conviction records for the purposes of evaluating any 
facility or program that offers services to children); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97. 
 108 See PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5, 7 (summarizing the procedural protections and 
other benefits to individuals with criminal records contained in the CORI Reform Act); Massing, 
supra note 12, at 22–24 (commenting on how the CORI Reform Act increased the availability of 
official CORI information while simultaneously incorporating a variety of restrictions on when 
and how the criminal record information could be used). 
 109 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(d) (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015). This barrier ensures 
that employers have access to only the criminal record information that they are statutorily entitled 
to receive. See id. § 172; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 175. If employers were authorized to request 
prospective employees to provide CORI reports, the employer would be able to see the full and 
unrestricted CORI report that individuals are statutorily authorized to personally receive. See 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 175. 
 110 See 2010 Mass. Acts 1090–91. Commonly referred to as a “ban the box” initiative, this 
component of the revised statute provides opportunity for individuals with criminal records to 
obtain interviews and seek to explain elements of their criminal records if necessary. See MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(9½) (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 8 
(noting that the “ban the box” provision was intended to increase the numbers of individuals with 
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landlord chooses not to hire or rent to an individual based on the existence 
of a criminal record, the employer or landlord must provide a copy of the 
CORI report to the individual and give them the opportunity to contest the 
accuracy of the information.111 Finally, individuals are permitted to obtain 
their own CORI reports in order to provide an opportunity to ensure the ac-
curacy of the record and to see who has viewed the record.112 
B. The Sealing of Criminal Convictions Under Chapter 276, Section 100A 
of the Massachusetts General Laws 
In order to counterbalance the impact of increased access to records 
and further the interest in promoting opportunities for ex-offenders, the 
CORI Reform Act significantly decreased the waiting period for automatic 
sealing under chapter 276, section 100A of the Massachusetts General 
Laws.113 Before the second phase of CORI reform went into effect in 2012, 
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor had to wait ten years to have their 
record sealed and individuals convicted of a felony had to wait fifteen 
years.114 CORI reform reduced the waiting period to seal to five years for a 
misdemeanor conviction, ten years for a felony conviction, and fifteen years 
for certain sex offenses.115 Although pleased with the decreased waiting 
                                                                                                                           
CORI records who were obtaining interviews). Certain employers are exempted from this provi-
sion if federal or state law mandates that individuals with certain convictions should be disquali-
fied from obtaining a particular type of employment. See 2010 Mass. Acts 1090–91. 
 111 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(c) (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015); Carie Torrence, 
Massachusetts Becomes the Second State to “Ban the Box” on All Employment Applications, 
LITTLER MENDELSON P.C., (Aug. 11, 2010), http://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/
massachusetts-becomes-second-state-ban-box-all-employment-applications [https://perma.cc/373E-
P5CQ] (explaining that an employer who obtains a criminal record of a prospective employee 
must disclose this information to the prospective employee or face potential civil and criminal 
sanctions). 
 112 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(5); Know Your CORI Rights, GREATER BOS. LE-
GAL SERVS. 12 (2014) [hereinafter CORI Rights], http://www.masslegalhelp.org/cori/booklets-
folder/know-your-cori-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXX2-AMJU]. This comprehensive personal 
right to access CORI reports was a targeted response to previous issues and concerns with the 
accuracy of the information maintained by the CHSB. See Healy, supra note 94, at 6 (describing 
how numerous anecdotal accounts existed regarding inaccurate information in the CORI system 
and arguing for changes to the system to allow easier fact checking and error correction); Kaplan, 
supra note 94, at 12, 16–17 (noting that prior to the 2010 reform, it was difficult to detect and 
remove errors in particular CORI reports and that certain commentators felt that the CORI system 
needed additional safeguards in place to ensure the accuracy of criminal record information). 
 113 See Massing, supra note 12, at 22. As the requirements for sealing under section 100A are 
procedural in nature, sealing is automatic upon petition by an eligible individual. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2014). 
 114 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 192 n.17 (discussing the previously longer waiting periods for rec-
ord sealing); Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 772 N.E.2d 1067, 1073 (Mass. 2002) (noting that, as of 
2002, there was a ten- to fifteen-year waiting period to seal convictions under section 100A).  
 115 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A. Additionally, the time period for sealing now 
begins following release from custody whereas the waiting period under the prior version of the 
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periods, many proponents of increased access to criminal record sealing had 
hoped for an even more expeditious route to sealing.116  
In addition to the mandated waiting period, individuals seeking to seal 
under section 100A must satisfy several procedural requirements.117 First, 
an individual must not have been found guilty of an additional misdemean-
or or felony in the five or ten years respectively preceding the criminal of-
fense they are petitioning to seal.118 Additionally, sealing is not available for 
individuals convicted of certain criminal offenses, including firearms of-
fenses, crimes against public justice, and crimes committed by public offi-
cials in the scope of their official conduct.119 Even if information is sealed 
under section 100A, however, it is still accessible by certain statutorily au-
thorized entities.120  
                                                                                                                           
statute did not begin until the completion of a period of probation or other state supervision. See 
id. (allowing sealing of conviction records if, along with satisfying other statutory requirements, 
an individual “has not been imprisoned in any state or county in the case of a misdemeanor, within 
the preceding 5 years, and in the case of a felony, within the preceding 10 years” (emphasis add-
ed)); Kelleher, supra note 43, § 15.4.3 (explaining that under the amended section 100A, the wait-
ing period for sealing begins after an individual is released from custody, whereas before it began 
after an individual’s court-ordered supervision was finished). 
 116 See Massing, supra note 12, at 21 (describing how before the passage of the CORI Reform 
Act, there were several legislative efforts to more ambitiously decrease waiting periods for seal-
ing); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5 (noting State Senator Cynthia Creem’s desire to have 
changed waiting periods to three years for misdemeanors and seven years for felonies); John C. 
Drake, Advocates of Limiting Use of Crime Records Fault Patrick Bill, BOSTON.COM (May 23, 
2008), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/05/23/advocates_of_limiting_crime_record_
use_fault_patrick_bill/?page=full [https://perma.cc/7HEJ-34NW] (explaining how advocates be-
lieved that waiting periods of five years and ten years for a misdemeanor and felony respectively 
were too long). In support of this position, advocates cited a 2006 study that argued that after 
seven years, there is an insignificant difference in the risk of recidivism for individuals with a 
prior criminal record and those with none. See Megan C. Kurlychek et al., Enduring Risk? Old 
Criminal Records and Short-Term Predictions of Criminal Involvement, 53 CRIME & DELIN-
QUENCY 64, 64 (2007); Drake, supra; see also PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (explaining 
how some advocates of CORI reform believed that three- and seven-year waiting periods for mis-
demeanor and felony convictions respectively should be adopted). Similarly, a 2002 study by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics at the Department of Justice found that two-thirds of recidivism occurs 
in the first year following an individual’s release from incarceration. See TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COAL., COST-SAVING STRATEGIES FOR TEXAS’ CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 
PART 2 OF 4, at 2 (2011) (citing PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 




 117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id.; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §§ 121–31H (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268, §§ 1–
40 (2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 268A, §§ 1–29 (2014). 
 120 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015); Cristley, 
supra note 89, § 2.2.5; Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97. In 1978, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southampton weighed in on the need to balance the 
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C. Discretionary Criminal Record Sealing Under Chapter 276, Section 
100C of the Massachusetts General Laws Before and  
After Commonwealth v. Pon 
Pursuant to chapter 276, section 100C, paragraph 1 of the Massachu-
setts General Laws, criminal records relating to cases that end in acquittals, 
fail to produce indictments, or do not result in a finding of probable cause 
are automatically sealed by the Massachusetts Commissioner of Proba-
tion.121 Another concession made by the legislature during the passage of 
the CORI Reform Act was to increase access to sealing of non-conviction 
data under section 100C, paragraph 1.122 As part of the CORI Reform Act, 
the legislature allowed for automatic sealing of non-conviction data for 
CWOFs that result in dismissals.123 
Unlike section 100C, paragraph 1, cases that end in a dismissal or nol-
le prosequi pursuant to section 100C, paragraph 2 can be sealed only if a 
Massachusetts court determines that “substantial justice would be served” 
by sealing.124 Because the statute does not define what “substantial justice” 
means in this context, the term has been left to the courts to be interpret-
                                                                                                                           
right to privacy under the CORI Act with the right of criminal justice agencies to access criminal 
record information. See 373 N.E.2d 1128, 1131–33 (Mass. 1978). In Rzeznik, an individual with 
two prior felony convictions was denied a firearms license even though the record of his past felo-
nies had been sealed. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 122B (1973); Rzeznik, 373 N.E.2d at 
1131. The statute stated that a chief of police was not permitted to grant firearm licenses to any 
individual who had been convicted of a felony in any state or jurisdiction. See MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 140, § 122B; Rzeznik, 373 N.E.2d at 1131 & n.1. The court held that under the CORI Act, 
criminal justice agencies were statutorily authorized to access criminal records, including those 
that had previously been judicially sealed. See Rzeznik, 373 N.E.2d at 1132–33; see also Gilbert, 
supra note 31, at 13 (“The Supreme Judicial Court declined to read the sealing statute so as to 
preclude access to a sealed criminal record through CORI by a criminal justice agency.”). This 
remains good law under the CORI Reform Act. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(1). 
 121 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C para. 1 (2014). The law states, 
In any criminal case wherein the defendant has been found not guilty by the court or 
jury, or a no bill has been returned by the grand jury, or a finding of no probable 
cause has been made by the court, . . . courts in which the proceedings occurred or 
were initiated shall likewise seal the records of the proceedings in their files. 
Id. 
 122 See id.; Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.3.1 (describing how restrictive language preventing 
automatic sealing in cases where there was a period of probation prior to dismissal was deleted 
from section 100C as part of the CORI Reform Act). 
 123 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C para. 1; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 18 (2014); 
Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.3.1. 
 124 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C para. 2; Commonwealth v. Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 
1258 (Mass. 1995) (stating that a different standard applies for sealing non-conviction records 
depending on whether a particular case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of section 100C). 
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ed.125 In the wake of the CORI Reform Act, the Supreme Judicial Court de-
viated from a long-standing interpretation of “substantial justice” in order to 
better align itself with the Massachusetts legislature.126 
1. The Hardline Standard Established by Commonwealth v. Doe 
In 1995, in Commonwealth v. Doe, the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts weighed in on the proper definition and application of the “sub-
stantial justice” standard in determining whether to seal a criminal record 
that resulted in a dismissal or nolle prosequi pursuant to chapter 276, sec-
tion 100C, paragraph 2 of the Massachusetts General Laws.127 In doing so, 
the Supreme Judicial Court created a rigid standard that weighed heavily 
against discretionary sealing in such cases.128 
In defining “substantial justice,” the Supreme Judicial Court sought to 
balance the public’s right to access information regarding criminal proceed-
ings under the First Amendment and the individual’s interest in privacy and 
preventing the dissemination of criminal record information.129 The Su-
preme Judicial Court looked to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit’s 1989 decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski for guidance.130 In 
that decision, the First Circuit held that the broad strokes attempt to limit 
the public’s access to criminal records of cases that result in nolle prosequi 
or dismissals under the second paragraph of section 100C triggered First 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C para. 2; Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 189; Doe, 648 N.E.2d 
at 1258. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the term “substantial justice” 
does not “lend itself to a clear definition.” Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 189–90. 
 126 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 189; Jennifer S. Lynn, Recent Changes in the Discretionary Sealing 
Process for CORI Records, STRANG, SCOTT, GIROUX & YOUNG, LLP (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.
strangscott.com/recent-changes-in-the-discretionary-sealing-process-for-cori-records [perma.cc/
42UY-FBD8] (explaining that the Pon decision deviated significantly from past court precedent 
and served to lower the standard for discretionary sealing under the first paragraph of section 
100C). 
 127 Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1256, 1259. The defendant in the criminal case that led to the decision 
in Doe was an eighteen-year-old student who had been charged with multiple criminal offenses, 
including rape. Id. at 1257. After determining that the underlying allegations lacked merit, the 
Suffolk District Attorney decided not to prosecute the case and entered a nolle prosequi. See id. 
Shortly after the nolle prosequi was entered, the defendant filed a petition to seal the record of his 
case in accordance with section 100C, paragraph 2 on the grounds that a criminal record would 
adversely impact his future employment and educational opportunities. See id. Initially, the de-
fendant’s petition to have his record sealed was denied by a judge in Roxbury District Court who 
found that the defendant had failed to show that the criminal record would cause anything more 
than “a potential harm to his reputation, employment prospects or privacy.” See id. 
 128 See Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1256, 1260–61; see also Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 186 (describing the 
Doe standard as “stringent”). 
 129 See Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1258. 
130 See id. at 1258–60. 
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Amendment concerns.131 The Supreme Judicial Court interpreted the First 
Circuit’s guidance from Pokaski as establishing a strict and demanding 
standard for the discretionary sealing of criminal records.132  
According to the Supreme Judicial Court, in order for the “substantial 
justice” standard to be satisfied, a defendant had to show that his or her per-
sonal interest in sealing a record “clearly outweighs the constitutionally-
based value” of public access to the criminal record.133 To do so, the court 
required the defendant to demonstrate that the inability to seal his or her 
criminal record would pose a specific personal harm beyond a general 
threat to “reputation and privacy interests.”134 Additionally, the Supreme 
Judicial Court instructed judges reviewing petitions for sealing to evaluate 
all relevant details and factors, including the reason or reasons why a par-
ticular criminal case was dismissed or nolle prossed.135 The Supreme Judi-
cial Court emphasized that sealing of criminal records should be reserved 
for “exceptional cases.”136 
2. Recalibration in Commonwealth v. Pon 
In the wake of significant changes to the CORI system and record seal-
ing statutes, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2014 in Common-
                                                                                                                           
 131 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502, 510 (1st Cir. 1989). The First 
Circuit determined that a compelling interests and least restrictive means test governed the discre-
tionary sealing of records allowed by section 100C, paragraph 2. See id. at 505. The First Circuit 
stated that the statute should not “infringe upon the First Amendment any more than is necessary 
to promote [its] objectives.” Id. 
 132 See Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1259–61. The Doe court established a two-stage hearing process 
whereby defendants seeking to seal records under section 100C, paragraph 2 had to first make a 
prima facie case establishing that sealing is warranted. See id. at 1259. Should a defendant succeed 
in making this prima facie showing, a second hearing would be ordered and the public must be 
given notice and opportunity to oppose the defendant’s request to seal the record. See id. at 1260. 
 133 See id. at 1260–61. Additionally, the defendant had to show that his or her privacy inter-
ests have not already been irrevocably impacted by the public nature of the criminal proceedings 
against them. See id. at 1259. 
 134 See id. at 1259. The court tempered this requirement slightly by stating that defendant did 
not have to show an “actual likelihood of immediate harm.” See id. at 1261. 
 135 See id. at 1260–61. 
 136 See id. at 1259; see also Jeffrey J. Pyle, The Unwarranted Secrecy of Criminal Justice 
Information in Massachusetts, 59 BOS. B.J. 17, 21 (2015) (“The value of open court proceedings 
is so weighty, and the First Amendment right so strong, that both the Pokaski and Doe courts 
anticipated that few defendants would be able to seal records under this standard.”). Although it 
established a strict standard for discretionary sealing in Doe, the Supreme Judicial Court did rec-
ognize that significant personal and societal interests exist for sealing criminal records. See 648 
N.E.2d at 1258, 1261. In addition to a general interest in privacy, the Doe court acknowledged that 
criminal records could have adverse impacts on an individual’s ability to obtain employment and 
educational advancement. See id. at 1258, 1261. 
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wealth v. Pon reevaluated the Doe decision’s longstanding sealing standard.137 
The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the Doe court’s interpretation of 
“substantial justice” presented too high a bar for discretionary record sealing 
and was incongruous with the intentions of the Massachusetts legislature.138 
In Pon, the Supreme Judicial Court found that criminal records from 
cases resulting in nolle prosequis or dismissals are not subject to a First 
Amendment presumption of availability.139 In doing so, the court departed 
from the guidance of the First Circuit in Pokaski and from its own prior de-
cision in Doe.140 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has never decided the 
issue of whether First Amendment presumption of access applies to crimi-
nal records from cases resulting in a nolle prosequi and dismissal, the Su-
preme Judicial Court determined that it was not required to follow the First 
Circuit’s guidance from Pokaski.141 As a result, the court found that the par-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 186 (finding that the Doe court’s “stringent standard” for discre-
tionary sealing was inconsistent with the Massachusetts legislature’s new approach to criminal 
record management pursuant to the CORI Reform Act); Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1260–61 (laying out 
the “substantial justice” standard used for discretionary sealing). 
 138 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 186, 194; supra notes 95–112 and accompanying text (describing 
the massive legislative overhaul of the Massachusetts system for criminal record management and 
access). The criminal case that led to the decision in Pon involved a defendant who received a 
CWOF for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of prop-
erty damage. See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 186–87. Ultimately, the case against the defendant was dis-
missed following a recommendation from the probation department. See id. at 187. After the case 
was dismissed, the defendant petitioned to seal his criminal record under paragraph 2 of section 
100C. See id. While the case was being litigated, the Commissioner of Probation sealed the record 
of the defendant’s recent arrest under section 100A and therefore the issue of sealing this particu-
lar defendant’s criminal record was moot by the time the Supreme Judicial Court was set to issue 
its opinion. See id. Despite the defendant’s record being sealed, the Supreme Judicial Court decid-
ed to use the case to provide a new standard for evaluating the “substantial justice” requirement 
for discretionary sealing of criminal records under section 100C, paragraph 2. See id. at 188. 
 139 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 196. The Supreme Judicial Court used a two-stage constitutional 
inquiry for determining whether First Amendment public access applied to these particular types 
of criminal records. See id.; see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1986) 
(examining how the U.S. Supreme Court has approached the First Amendment right of access to 
criminal proceedings in past cases). First, the Supreme Judicial Court held that criminal records of 
cases resulting in a dismissal or nolle prosequi have not historically been treated as open to the 
public in the same sense that other criminal records, such as those resulting in convictions, have 
been. See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 195. Second, the court found that open access to the particular types 
of criminal records being considered did not play a significant role in fostering transparency and 
public scrutiny of the criminal justice system. See id. at 195–96. 
 140 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 196; see also Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 502, 505 (stating that there is a 
First Amendment right of public access to records related to criminal proceedings); Doe, 648 
N.E.2d at 1259–61 (describing the more rigid standard for discretionary sealing that the Pon court 
decided to abandon). 
 141 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 194. Many states hold this view of the persuasive authority, and not 
binding authority, of federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Cook v. Pop-
plewell, 394 S.W.3d 323, 346 (Ky. 2011) (stating that the decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit are not binding on the Kentucky Supreme Court); French v. Hines, 957 A.2d 
1000, 1035 n.21 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (stating that Maryland courts are not required to fol-
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ticular criminal records being considered were not subject to a First 
Amendment presumption of public access, but rather were governed by the 
less stringent common-law presumption of public access.142 
Under the common-law presumption of public access, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that criminal records from cases resulting in a dismissal 
or nolle prosequi could be sealed pursuant to section 100C, paragraph 2 
based on a showing of “good cause.”143 The new “good cause” interpreta-
tion of “substantial justice” decreased the burden on defendants seeking 
discretionary sealing.144 
After explaining the rationale for its “good cause” standard, the Su-
preme Judicial Court went on to outline the balancing test that judges 
should apply in determining whether to seal a criminal record of a dismissal 
or nolle prosequi.145 In framing its multi-factor balancing test, the Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that the public’s interest in having access to records 
must be weighed against the significant private and governmental interests 
that weigh in favor of sealing.146 First, judges should examine the particular 
disadvantages that individuals will encounter due to public access of their 
criminal records.147 Next, judges should consider efforts and proof of reha-
bilitation by individuals seeking to have their records sealed.148 Third, judg-
                                                                                                                           
low guidance of lower federal courts); Combs v. Ins. Co. of Ill., 497 N.E.2d 503, 507 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1986) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court is the only federal court whose decisions are bind-
ing with respect to the decisions of courts in Illinois). 
 142 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 196–97 (citing Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 602 
(1978); New Eng. Internet Café, LLC v. Clerk of the Superior Court for Criminal Bus., 966 
N.E.2d 797, 803 (Mass. 2012)). 
 143 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 197–98. 
 144 See id. at 198; Massachusetts Ruling Reduces Access to Criminal Court Records, PRINCE 
LOBEL BLOG (Aug. 15, 2014), http://www.princelobel.com/news-publications-382.html [https://
perma.cc/S9AW-76DV] [hereinafter Massachusetts Ruling Reduces Access] (arguing that the new 
standard is “weighted in favor of sealing”); SJC Establishes New Standard to Seal Criminal Cas-
es, GREATER BOS. LEGAL SERV., http://www.gbls.org/news/sjc-establishes-new-standard-seal-
criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/P6HL-7QN5] [hereinafter SJC Establishes New Standard to Seal] 
(stating that the new standard will facilitate increased opportunity for criminal record sealing). 
 145 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 198–200. 
 146 See id. at 199–200. These interests include promoting privacy, increasing access to gainful 
employment and suitable housing, and combating recidivism. See id. 
 147 See id. at 200. Unlike Doe, individuals seeking to seal their records are not required to 
show that they are at risk of specific harm. See id.; Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1259 (“A defendant must 
show that specific harm is threatened by the continued existence of the record.”). Defendants 
must, however, proffer with “sufficient particularity and credibility” a presently existing or likely 
to exist disadvantage resulting from the availability of their criminal record. See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 
200. The court provided a non-exhaustive list of potential disadvantages, including unemploy-
ment, underemployment, homelessness, inability to pursue certain categories of employment, and 
inability to participate in social and communal activities caused by the existence of a criminal 
record. See id. at 201. 
 148 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 201 (stating that evidence of rehabilitation can include “[e]mployment 
attempts, community or civic engagement, successful completion of a probationary period or a sobri-
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es should decide whether sealing a criminal record would actually serve to 
mitigate the adverse effects of its public availability.149 Fourth, judges 
should inquire as to the individual’s likelihood of reoffending by examining 
relevant factors from the time of the offense.150 Fifth, judges should take 
note of the amount of time that has passed since the underlying offense.151 
Finally, judges should inquire as to the factors and rationales behind why 
the particular case ended in a nolle prosequi or dismissal.152 In addition to 
these specific factors, judges are also instructed to consider “any relevant 
information” necessary to balance the relevant interests in play.153 
III. THE MASSACHUSETTS MODEL: HOW MASSACHUSETTS CAN BECOME 
AN EXEMPLAR FOR STATE AND FEDERAL APPROACHES TO  
CRIMINAL RECORD SEALING AND EXPUNGEMENT 
Over the last five years, Massachusetts has created a more holistic and 
comprehensive scheme for criminal record sealing.154 This Part argues that 
                                                                                                                           
ety or mental health treatment, lack of further contact with the criminal justice system, or other ac-
complishments”). 
 149 See id. In making this determination, the court instructed judges to consider the type of 
crime that was committed, the “stigma or stereotypes” associated with that type of crime, and 
whether sealing can be accomplished without creating a danger for the community. See id. The 
court also noted that a particularly newsworthy case may not be amenable to sealing due to the 
erosion of the defendant’s privacy. See id. 
 150 See id. For example, a defendant’s youth at the time of committing a criminal offense 
weighs in favor of sealing. See id. at 201–02 (citing Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y, 1 N.E.3d 270, 283–
85 (Mass. 2013)). Prior criminal activity, however, “weighs against sealing, as it suggests a great-
er likelihood of re-offense.” See id. at 202. 
 151 See id. at 202. When analyzing the temporal component, judges are instructed to balance 
the public’s opportunity to access records and the risk that the defendant might reoffend. See id. 
After some time has passed, there is a stronger argument for sealing as the risk of reoffending falls 
and the public’s need for access is lessened. See id. 
 152 See id. These factors include whether the case was dismissed with or without prejudice and 
whether it was the product of an agreed-upon disposition. See id. 
 153 See id. at 200 (citing New Eng. Internet Café, LLC, 966 N.E.2d at 809). In addition to 
instituting a “good cause” interpretation of the “substantial justice” standard, the Supreme Judicial 
Court also made a noteworthy change to the procedural process for sealing nolle prosequi and 
dismissed criminal records under paragraph 2 of section 100C. See id. at 203–05. The court de-
termined that, in accordance with the new lowered standard, a single hearing would be sufficient 
to determine whether “good cause” exists to seal a criminal record for a case that resulted in a 
dismissal or nolle prosequi. See id. at 204. With this new, simplified procedural standard, the court 
sought to promote the dual purposes of improving judicial economy and reducing the burden on 
pro se petitioners seeking to have their records sealed. See id. 
 154 See Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182, 190–91, 193–94 (Mass. 2014) (stating that a 
more open standard for the discretionary sealing of certain non-conviction records was in accord-
ance with the Massachusetts legislature’s general intent to increase access to criminal records in 
the name of public safety while also allowing record sealing to promote second chances for indi-
viduals with criminal records); Massing, supra note 12, at 24 (explaining that CORI reform was 
aimed to “demystify” criminal records and provide opportunities for individuals with criminal 
records to be rehabilitated). 
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Massachusetts, in light of the recent judicial and legislative overhaul to its 
system of criminal record sealing, has the potential to serve as a model for 
reform at the state and federal level.155 Section A argues that other states and 
the federal government should enact or incorporate certain aspects of the 
Massachusetts system for criminal record sealing and record management 
alongside existing record sealing statutes.156 Section B argues that Massa-
chusetts should reevaluate several elements of the CORI Reform Act and 
the decision in Commonwealth v. Pon in order to better serve as an exem-
plar for other jurisdictions.157 
A. What’s Working: Elements of the Massachusetts Approach That Should 
Be Adopted at the State and Federal Level 
If legislatures are committed to providing meaningful pathways for re-
habilitation and reducing recidivism, they must create more comprehensive 
and expeditious opportunities for criminal record sealing or expunge-
ment.158 The changes that have taken place in Massachusetts have dramati-
cally impacted the ease, speed, and general availability of criminal record 
sealing for the state’s residents.159 These reforms represent necessary and 
judicious elements of a cohesive criminal record sealing statute that should 
be emulated by other states and the federal government.160 
1. Other States and the Federal Government Should Allow Broader Access 
to Automatic Sealing or Expungement 
One of the most impactful elements of the Massachusetts approach for 
ex-offenders is the ability to access criminal record sealing for the vast ma-
jority of criminal offenses, including misdemeanor and felony convic-
                                                                                                                           
 155 See infra notes 158–221 and accompanying text. 
 156 See infra notes 158–194 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 195–221 and accompanying text. 
 158 See Mouzon, supra note 5, at 2 (arguing that criminal histories can serve as a “life-long 
handicap” for individuals and limit their ability to find gainful employment and social ac-
ceptance); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 13 (“Cleansing a criminal record can be a use-
ful tool to shield individuals from the continuing negative effects of a conviction.”); see also 
GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 5, 32 (noting that a criminal record results in negative social and eco-
nomic consequences and arguing that Texas should give further consideration to how it manages 
and distributes criminal history information). 
 159 See, e.g., Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 197 (easing the burden on individuals seeking to seal records 
of nolle prosequis and dismissals); 2010 Mass. Acts 1095–96 (reducing waiting periods for auto-
matic sealing of misdemeanor and felony convictions); Pangonis, supra note 26, § 18.3.1 (describ-
ing how the CORI Reform Act authorized the possibility of discretionary sealing of non-
conviction data in cases that involved a period of probation, but ended in a dismissal). 
 160 See infra notes 161–194 and accompanying text. 
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tions.161 Even in the states that do allow for the sealing or expungement of 
convictions, many statutes involve detailed restrictions based on the type 
and classification of offense and the prior history of the offender.162 These 
limitations on the availability of sealing or expungement prevent many ex-
offenders from obtaining relief.163  
Providing greater access to criminal record sealing or expungement 
does not mean that states have to offer a remedy for all offenses in a uni-
form manner.164 Rather, states should recalibrate the balance between the 
individual and public interests with respect to particular categories or types 
of criminal offenses and thereby facilitate more genuine opportunities for 
individuals to cleanse their records.165 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2014) (authorizing automatic sealing of misde-
meanor convictions after a five-year waiting period and felony convictions after a ten-year waiting 
period, provided that there have been no guilty findings during the statutory waiting period); 
PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (remarking that the “best way” for individuals to avoid nega-
tive ramifications associated with a criminal record is to have the record sealed). Massachusetts 
does not allow sealing for a narrow group of criminal offenses, such as certain firearms offenses, 
crimes against public justice, and criminal offenses committed by public officials while acting 
under the color of their authority. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A. 
 162 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078(1), (4)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015) (allowing an 
individual to seal only a misdemeanor offense provided that the individual has not been convicted 
of another misdemeanor in the last five years and has no prior felony convictions); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-19-71(1)–(2)(a) (2015) (authorizing expungement for a first offender who has commit-
ted a misdemeanor or a narrow range of felonies such as passing a bad check or possession of a 
controlled substance); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 18(A) (Supp. 2015) (limiting expungement of felo-
nies to non-violent offenses where the individual received a gubernatorial pardon, had his or her 
case dismissed after successfully completing a deferred judgment, has never had a prior convic-
tion, or has waited at least ten years). 
 163 See Love, supra note 8, at 20 (explaining that the majority of states place restrictions on 
sealing or expungement which make the remedies unavailable to repeat offenders and/or violent 
offenders); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 36 (arguing that eligibility restrictions, confus-
ing procedural barriers, and long waiting periods undermine the accessibility and efficacy of crim-
inal record sealing and expungement statutes); see also GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 24–25 (com-
menting that the numerous restrictions and limitations on the ability to petition for “expunction” of 
a record in Texas translates into low numbers of ex-offenders benefitting from the relief). 
 164 See Silva, supra note 7, at 191, 195–96 (describing how expungement statutes arise out of 
the state legislative process and how non-uniform approaches to sealing and expungement can be 
successful and efficacious in their own right); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., supra note 9, 
at 8–12 (describing how recent legislative reform efforts around sealing and expungement have 
varied greatly in their scope and proposed availability); see also Collateral Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions, supra note 4, at 141 (statement of Rep. Cohen, Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) (arguing that states should be given incentives by the federal government to develop 
laws that offer expungement remedies). Massachusetts, for example, retains a distinction between 
misdemeanor, felony, and sexual offenses that is reflected in different waiting periods required before 
sealing can occur. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (allowing sealing for misdemeanor 
convictions after five years, felonies after ten years, and certain sex offenses after fifteen years). 
 165 See Love, supra note 8, at 24 (arguing that the efficacy of certain states’ sealing or ex-
pungement provisions is limited because certain offenders are unable to access the remedy); 
DeJarnatt, supra note 26, at 1082 (acknowledging that a perfect solution for sealing and expunge-
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The federal government and states should enact or revise sealing or 
expungement statutes in a way that diminishes discretion and provides 
broad access to the remedy.166 Even if a particular offense or category of 
crime is eligible for sealing, some states endow the judiciary with signifi-
cant discretion to determine whether or not a particular individual should be 
allowed to seal or expunge a particular criminal record.167 Where this broad 
discretionary power exists, ex-offenders living within the same state may be 
faced with disparate or arbitrary decisions based on minor differences be-
tween their cases or based on the particular judge who hears the petition to 
seal or expunge.168  
2. Other Jurisdictions Should Emulate the Targeted Availability 
Restrictions and Procedural Protections Provided Under the  
CORI Reform Act 
Although sealing or expungement is available in some form in the ma-
jority of states, its impact on ex-offenders is inherently limited in scope if 
                                                                                                                           
ment has not been identified, but arguing that states could offer ex-offenders more robust sealing 
or expungement remedies without harming the public well-being). 
 166 See Silva, supra note 7, at 198 (describing expungement as an efficacious vehicle to com-
bat recidivism and facilitate rehabilitation and reintegration); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., 
supra note 9, at 8 (highlighting the argument that sealing or expungement statutes can serve to 
alleviate collateral consequences of criminal convictions and facilitate successful reintegration for 
ex-offenders); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 34, 42 (arguing that too much discretion in 
a sealing or expungement statute may undermine its efficacy by allowing individual judges and 
prosecutors to oppose petitions that otherwise satisfy statutory requirements). 
 167 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-32-101(g)(1)(A), (g)(5) (Lexis though 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(instructing courts to balance the interests of the ex-offender with the “best interests of justice and 
public safety” when deciding whether to allow the expungement of certain eligible felony offens-
es); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-13-1501(g), 1502(g) (2014) (allowing a court to deny a petition to 
expunge a record of a misdemeanor or felony if it determines that petitioner is a danger to “him-
self, any identifiable victim or society”); see also GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 24 (describing how 
Texas’s discretionary expungement statute was criticized for causing “inconsistent and possibly 
unfair application across the state”). In the District of Columbia, for example, the court is instruct-
ed to balance the interests of the individual in sealing his or her record against the interests of the 
community in accessing the record to balance public safety and society’s interest in the rehabilita-
tion of the individual. See D.C. CODE § 16-803(h)(1) (Supp. 2015). Under this discretionary 
standard, the court may take into account factors such as the nature and kind of the offense, how 
many arrests and or convictions the individual is seeking to seal, the individual’s involvement in 
the underlying offense, and victim impact statements. See id. § 16-803(h)(2). 
 168 See Henson, supra note 27, at 390–92 (arguing that discretionary judicial expungement in 
Alabama can lead to unequal and unpredictable results for ex-offenders seeking a second chance); 
GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 24 (pointing out that some critics say that giving too much discretion 
to judges or prosecutors to influence expungement decisions leads to “inconsistent and possibly 
unfair” results); see also Joseph C. Dugan, I Did My Time: The Transformation of Indiana’s Ex-
pungement Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1321, 1342 (2015) (expressing concern that the high degree of dis-
cretion in Indiana’s expungement statute will result in inconsistent and arbitrary decisions on 
particular expungement petitions). 
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there are no procedural protections in place to restrict or discourage em-
ployers and housing providers from inquiring about criminal histories, ob-
taining and utilizing third party criminal background checks, or accessing 
inaccurate records.169 In its recent CORI reform, Massachusetts has taken 
several important steps to enhance the practical efficacy of its sealing stat-
ute and to control the use and accuracy of the records it maintains that other 
jurisdictions should replicate.170  
First, other jurisdictions should create granular access controls that 
dictate who can access criminal records and what information those records 
contain in a particular request.171 In Massachusetts, the CORI Reform Act 
limits most requestors, such as general employers and landlords, to “Stand-
ard Access,” but allows more comprehensive access to certain entities that 
work with vulnerable populations or who are statutorily required to have 
certain information.172 States should emulate Massachusetts’s tiered ap-
proach to access and craft the availability of criminal record information in 
direct relation to the statutory or regulatory obligations and particular vul-
nerabilities of their agencies and organizations.173 This approach allows for 
the dissemination of information necessary to ensure public safety while 
                                                                                                                           
 169 See Geffen & Letze, supra note 4, at 1371–72 (describing the harms to ex-offenders when 
criminal records are not properly maintained or adequately expunged); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 
11, at 11–12 (pointing out that access to criminal record information through third parties, such as 
consumer reporting agencies, is a potential threat to the efficacy of criminal record sealing in Mas-
sachusetts). Effectively limiting access to criminal record and arrest information is an undeniable 
challenge considering the realities attendant to the modern digital age. See Jagunic, supra note 38, at 
170–72 (highlighting the broad availability and use of commercial criminal background checks, as 
well as the potential inaccuracy of state-run criminal record services). 
 170 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 190–93 (describing the efforts of Massachusetts legislatures to en-
courage use of official CORI reports while placing deliberate limits on what information can be 
accessed and who can access it); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 5 (explaining how the CORI 
Reform Act made changes to the law aimed at controlling who can access CORI reports and what 
information they can see); infra notes 171–176 and accompanying text. 
 171 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172 (LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015) (outlining the dissemi-
nation of CORI reports and the maintenance of the CORI system in Massachusetts); GAEBLER, 
supra note 24, at 12–15 (pointing out that criminal records, including those held by state-run 
agencies, are increasingly becoming accessible to the public to the detriment of ex-offenders and 
arrestees and recommending that Texas further restrict the use and availability of criminal record 
information). 
 172 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(2)–(3) (stating that the specific criminal history 
information that a requestor receives depends on the nature of the entity and the level of access 
given to the entity by statute); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97 (providing an overview of the 
different levels of access that various entities are given by statute). “Standard Access” means that 
these entities can only see pending cases, misdemeanors less than five years old, and felonies less 
than ten years old. See Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97. 
 173 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(2); Implementing Cori Reform, supra note 99 (lay-
ing out the different levels of “Required Access” that give certain organizations and entities access 
to additional criminal record information). 
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simultaneously restricting the ability of most requestors to access outdated 
and irrelevant criminal justice information.174  
Second, after establishing these specified access rights, legislatures 
should encourage requestors to use state-run record keeping systems in lieu 
of commercial vendors that may provide inaccurate or even sealed criminal 
record information.175 Although total prevention of improper use and access 
of criminal record information may be impracticable, states can and should 
attempt to minimize the prejudicial impact of these records by incentivizing 
usage of official and accurate databases.176 
In addition to more targeted access and procedural protections for re-
questors, states and the federal government should mimic the numerous 
protective provisions geared towards ex-offenders and arrestees under the 
CORI system.177 First, legislatures in other jurisdictions should introduce 
strict measures to ensure the accuracy and proper dissemination of their 
own internal information.178 Massachusetts facilitated this goal both by al-
lowing individuals to audit their own CORI records and mandating that the 
Department of Criminal Justice Information Services develop policies to 
ensure the ongoing accuracy of criminal records and to prevent unauthor-
ized individuals from accessing certain criminal record information.179 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(a)(6)–(32) (listing the entities and types of organiza-
tions that are statutorily provided with “Required Access”); Levels of CORI Access, supra note 97 
(offering an overview of certain agencies and organizations that are given “Standard Access” or 
“Required Access”). For example, whereas general employers and housing providers are only able 
to access conviction records within a specified time period, organizations with more recognizable 
vulnerabilities or statutory obligations are permitted to access CORI reports that contain records of 
youthful offender convictions, juvenile offender convictions, or non-conviction records. See 
PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 10; Implementing Cori Reform, supra note 99. 
 175 See PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 12 (explaining how commercial vendors sometimes 
release sealed records because they purchase records in bulk and then fail to keep records up to 
date with official databases); Katie Johnston, Access, Limits on Criminal Records, BOS. GLOBE 
(May 7, 2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/05/06/access-limits-criminal-records/
nzR3LSxq0NwFBOZKnTVfiM/story.html (pointing out that commercial criminal records vendors 
sometimes disseminate erroneous information); CORI Rights, supra note 112, at 16 (describing 
how the CORI Reform Act has built-in incentives for employers that seek to discourage use of 
third-party commercial criminal records vendors). 
 176 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 191–92; PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 11. In Pon, the Supreme 
Judicial Court directly acknowledged that the existence of third-party record providers may frus-
trate attempts to encourage usage of the iCORI system. See 14 N.E.3d at 203 n.35. The court, 
however, decided that the presence of commercial vendors and electronically available infor-
mation should not serve to negate the intentions of the legislature to create a centralized and offi-
cial system for the dissemination of criminal records. See id. 
 177 See infra notes 178–184 and accompanying text. 
 178 See GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 23 (arguing that state-level control over the availability of 
criminal record information is “notoriously weak”); Healy, supra note 94 (arguing that inaccurate 
criminal records frustrate the underlying goals of criminal record sealing). 
 179 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 171 (2014) (requiring that the DCJIS develop and maintain 
regulations and training to ensure that entities with access rights to CORI reports request, main-
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Measures such as these serve to combat the dissemination of inaccurate 
criminal record information and promote opportunity and rehabilitation for 
ex-offenders.180  
Second, other jurisdictions should adopt more automatic and stream-
lined procedure for sealing convictions.181 In Massachusetts, an individual 
seeking to seal a conviction record can simply fill out a one page “Petition 
to Seal” that will automatically be accepted provided that the individual has 
met the eligibility requirements.182 Unlike Massachusetts, many jurisdic-
tions that discretionarily seal or expunge conviction records require more 
burdensome procedures for sealing records that may require legal represen-
tation and end up being cost prohibitive.183 Further, state legislatures should 
rely more on recent scholarship addressing the risk of recidivism amongst 
                                                                                                                           
tain, and disseminate the information in a lawful manner); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 172(5) 
(LexisNexis Supp. Dec. 2015) (authorizing individuals to have full access to their own CORI 
reports); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 175 (2014) (giving individuals the right to review their own 
criminal record information and receive assistance in correcting the information if there are er-
rors). Under the revised statute, individuals are able to view their own report and receive assis-
tance from any involved criminal justice agency in correcting any inaccuracies in the system. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 175. Individuals are also offered a chance to contest the accuracy of 
their criminal records following receipt of an adverse decision from an employer or housing pro-
vider. See 803 MASS. CODE REGS. § 2.17(6) (2012); Gannon, supra note 97, at 1. 
 180 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 191–92 (stating that one of the significant procedural protections 
offered by CORI reform was to facilitate the accuracy of criminal record information which in 
turn provides better outcomes for individuals with criminal histories or arrest records); Jagunic, 
supra note 38, at 186 (arguing that credit reporting agencies should be required under state law to 
provide individuals with an opportunity to contest the accuracy of criminal record information 
before reports are disseminated). In turn, this will translate to improved accuracy for third-party 
background check providers that obtain and disseminate criminal records from state-run databases. 
See GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 13 (arguing that a particular state’s failure to keep criminal record 
information up to date will contribute to inaccurate information being collected and disseminated 
by third-party services). 
 181 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A; Silva, supra note 7, at 192 (characterizing the 
Massachusetts approach to sealing conviction records as “fairly standardized,” involving a form 
that is “easily accessible and uncomplicated”). 
 182 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (stating that the Commissioner of Probation “shall 
comply” with the petitioner’s request provided that the statutory elements, such as a waiting peri-
od and absence of a conviction of a narrow range of disqualifying offenses, are satisfied); Petition 
to Seal, MASS. COURT SYS., www.mass.gov/courts/docs/probation/sealingpetition.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VD7J-GQPR]. Most notably, individuals must wait five years in the case of a misde-
meanor and ten years in the case of a felony to file a petition to seal a criminal record. See MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A. 
 183 See GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 29 (describing how the procedure for sealing or expunge-
ment in some states involves the need to hire an attorney, pay filing fees, and participate in a for-
mal hearing). Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (providing a simple and straightfor-
ward route to record sealing), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6614(f)–(g) (West, Westlaw through 
2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring a hearing on a petition to expunge where the court considers whether 
the expungement is “consistent with the public welfare”), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-22-940(A) 
(2014 & Supp. 2014) (requiring a nonrefundable payment of $250 to file a petition to expunge a 
criminal record). 
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ex-offenders instead of endowing the judiciary with the ability to make 
speculative and subjective determinations about particular ex-offenders.184 
3. Commonwealth v. Pon Should Be Upheld if Challenged and Should 
Represent a National Baseline for Access to Criminal Record Sealing 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 2014 decision in Com-
monwealth v. Pon substantially changed the state’s approach to discretionarily 
sealing criminal records resulting in non-convictions.185 If the decision is at-
tacked collaterally, the Supreme Judicial Court’s approach should be main-
tained.186 First, the Supreme Judicial Court emphasized that state courts are 
not required to follow the decisions of federal courts unless those federal 
court decisions were accompanied by a decision from the U.S. Supreme 
Court.187 In turn, the Supreme Judicial Court was justified in finding that the 
First Amendment presumption of access does not necessarily apply to all 
criminal records despite the First Circuit’s decision to the contrary.188 Addi-
tionally, given the absence of a comprehensive approach to judicially or legis-
latively authorized sealing at the federal level, the Supreme Judicial Court 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See Kurlychek et al., supra note 116, at 64, 80 (explaining that after seven years of lawful 
behavior, there is a negligible risk that ex-offenders will reoffend); LANGAN & LEVIN, supra note 
116, at 3 (finding that two-thirds of offenders in a sample group reoffended within the first year 
following release). 
 185 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 189, 194 (finding that the older, more restrictive standard for sealing 
records under chapter 276, section 100C, paragraph 2 of the Massachusetts General Laws was contra-
ry to the legislative intent behind the 2010 CORI Reform Act); Tom Egan, Mass Supreme Judicial 
Court Eases Standard for Sealing of Criminal Record, MASS. LAW. WKLY. (Aug. 15, 2014), 
http://masslawyersweekly.com/2014/08/15/sjc-eases-standard-for-sealing-of-criminal-record [https://
perma.cc/KK33-XMUU] (describing how the change in the interpretation of the discretionary sealing 
statute would make it easier for individuals to seal their records). 
 186 See infra notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 187 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 194 (citing Commonwealth v. Montanez, 447 N.E.2d 660, 661–62 
(Mass. 1983)); see also Pollution Control Fin. Auth. v. County of Somerset, 735 A.3d 633, 643 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (“The only federal court decisions which constitute binding prec-
edent for state courts are decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”); State v. Woods, 524 
S.E.2d 363, 365 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]ith the exception of the United States Supreme Court, 
federal appellate decisions are not binding upon either the appellate or trial courts of this State.”). 
Because there has not been a specific U.S. Supreme Court decision on sealing records of dismissal 
or nolle prosequis, the Supreme Judicial Court acted within its authority when it decided not to 
follow the persuasive authority provided by the First Circuit. See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 194. 
 188 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 195–96 (finding that a First Amendment presumption of access has 
not historically attached to criminal records ending in dismissal or nolle prosequi and that unre-
stricted access to these particular non-conviction records is not necessary to facilitate the just and 
fair functioning of the court system); see also State v. D.H.W., 686 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (Fla. 1996) 
(holding that the First Amendment presumption of access does not necessarily attach to all crimi-
nal proceedings). 
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should have the liberty to fashion a judicial interpretation of a state statute 
that is in line with the decisions of the state’s legislature.189 
Other jurisdictions should follow Massachusetts’s example and adopt 
comprehensive statutes that allow for the sealing of criminal records for 
cases that do not result in a conviction as a national minimum standard.190 
Following the decision in Pon, the overall ability to seal non-conviction 
data in Massachusetts has increased significantly.191 In addition to automatic 
sealing of records of acquittals and unreturned indictments, individuals can 
now have records of a dismissal or nolle prosequi sealed under section 
100C, paragraph 2 upon a showing of good cause.192 Neither of these dispo-
sitions represents a finding of guilt by an impartial finder of fact and there-
fore collateral consequences should not attach.193 Especially in states that 
lack procedural protections that limit the ability of employers, housing pro-
viders, and other entities from inquiring about criminal backgrounds, a stat-
utory remedy allowing individuals to seal non-conviction records is neces-
sary to prevent discrimination and disadvantage.194 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 193–94 & n.21 (explaining that the interpretation of a discretionary 
sealing statute had not been changed in approximately twenty years and needed to be reconsidered 
in order to align with the intent of the state’s lawmakers in passing the CORI Reform Act); 
Mukherji, supra note 50, at 2 (commenting on how there is no uniform or broadly-applicable 
schema for sealing or expunging records at the federal level); Wurie, supra note 24, at 46 (describ-
ing the inconsistent and seldom-used practice of equitable expungement of criminal records at the 
federal level). 
 190 See Callanan, supra note 34, at 1304 (suggesting record sealing as a potential solution to 
protect individuals from the adverse use of non-conviction records); GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 
26–27 (arguing that there should be a relatively uniform national approach that places substantial 
limitations on the dissemination of non-conviction records). 
 191 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 194, 197–98; Michael DelSignore, SJC Lowers the Burden for Seal-
ing Criminal Records in Massachusetts, MASS. CRIM. DEF. LAW. BLOG, (Aug. 22, 2014, 5:12 
AM), http://www.massachusettscriminaldefenselawyerblog.com/2014/08/sjc-rules-in-favor-of-def
endan.html [https://perma.cc/9982-4USY] (explaining that the new standard established by Pon 
places a diminished burden on the individual to successfully petition to have his or her record 
sealed). 
 192 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C (2014) (authorizing automatic sealing of records 
for cases ending in acquittal or where there is no indictment or finding of probable cause and au-
thorizing discretionary sealing of records for cases that have been dismissed or nolle prossed); 
Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 197–98 (holding that courts should allow for the discretionary sealing of rec-
ords of dismissals and nolle prosequis when there is a showing that “good cause exists for seal-
ing”). 
 193 See Doe, 648 N.E.2d at 1260 (explaining that a case might be nolle prossed or dismissed 
due to reasons such as mistaken misidentification, lack of evidence, or a refusal of a witness to 
participate); Callanan, supra note 34, at 1278 (arguing that collateral consequences should not 
attach to non-convicted individuals, even if it means that some factually guilty individuals will 
benefit); Wurie, supra note 24, at 37 (arguing that criminal background checks should not include 
non-conviction information because that information is unnecessary and irrelevant to the purposes 
of a background check). 
 194 See Love, supra note 8, at 17 (explaining that an arrest record alone can be a serious im-
pediment to opportunity in certain cases); Shawn D. Stuckley, Note, Collateral Effects of Arrests 
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B. Continued Reform: Steps That Massachusetts Should Take to Emerge as 
the Model for Progressive Criminal Record Sealing 
Although Massachusetts has made significant progress, the marked 
shift towards more open access of criminal records in the state necessitates 
continued legislative and judicial attention to ensure that the individual in-
terests of privacy and opportunity are preserved.195 This section argues that 
several aspects of CORI reform and Pon should be recalibrated in favor of 
the individual’s right to privacy and rehabilitation.196 
1. Decrease Waiting Times for Automatic Sealing Pursuant to Chapter 276, 
Section 100A of the Massachusetts General Laws  
In order to establish itself as a national model for criminal record seal-
ing, Massachusetts should decrease the required waiting period before indi-
viduals can seek to seal criminal convictions.197 The conclusions of certain 
scientific studies have raised a material question as to whether general pub-
lic welfare and safety would be enhanced by providing ex-offenders with 
added opportunity to seal records sooner rather than later.198 Recognizing 
this, several states have enacted statutes that allow ex-offenders to seal or 
expunge their records in a shorter timeframe than allowed by the Massachu-
setts statute.199 In order to provide more meaningful and efficacious oppor-
                                                                                                                           
in Minnesota, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 335, 343 (2008) (arguing that unlike records of convictions, 
non-conviction data is highly prejudicial and “arguably irrelevant”). 
 195 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 192–93 (recognizing that increased access to criminal record sealing 
can mitigate the problems of diminished privacy and access to employment caused by more readi-
ly available criminal record information); Massing, supra note 12, at 22 (describing how the CORI 
Reform Act sought to balance individual interests of economic and social opportunity with the 
public interest of broader access to CORI data); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (identifying 
several aspects of the CORI Reform Act that could be further modified). 
 196 See infra notes 197–221 and accompanying text. 
 197 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (requiring individuals to wait five years before 
petitioning to seal a misdemeanor conviction and ten years before petitioning to seal a felony 
conviction); PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (arguing that waiting periods to seal convictions 
should be shorter and noting that advocates have argued for three- and seven-year waiting periods 
for misdemeanor and felony convictions respectively). 
 198 See Kurlychek et al., supra note 116, at 80 (pointing out the predictive value of a criminal 
record diminishes with the passage of time and that after seven years, the likelihood that an ex-
offender will commit a new offense is equal to an individual with no criminal history); LANGAN & 
LEVIN, supra note 116, at 3 (finding that the majority of ex-offenders in a sample group who 
reoffended did so within the first year after they were released). 
 199 Compare ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-90-1405 to -1406 (Supp. 2015) (allowing individuals to 
petition to seal records after sixty days in the case of a misdemeanor and five years in the case of 
an eligible felony offense), and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(A)(1) (West Supp. 2015) (per-
mitting individuals to seek to seal their records one year after their sentence is completed for a mis-
demeanor conviction and three years after their sentence is completed for an eligible felony convic-
tion), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (requiring individuals to wait five years to seal a 
misdemeanor conviction and ten years to seal a felony conviction). 
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tunity for rehabilitation, Massachusetts and other jurisdictions should pro-
vide more rapid access to criminal record sealing.200 
Even states, such as Massachusetts, that are unwilling to uniformly de-
crease waiting times could model their statutes after Nevada’s offense-based 
approach to sealing criminal records.201 In Nevada, the legislature estab-
lished a granular system of waiting periods that allows for sealing of mis-
demeanor convictions after two to five years and felony convictions after 
seven to fifteen years.202 In Massachusetts, the legislature could keep ten 
years for a felony and five years for a misdemeanor as maximum waiting 
periods, but could also have in place a graded system in which certain less 
serious offenses would become eligible for automatic sealing in a more 
timely fashion.203 For example, a more offense-specific system could man-
date that relatively serious misdemeanors, such as assault and battery, re-
main at a five-year waiting period while simultaneously allowing earlier 
access to sealing for less serious misdemeanors, such as refusing to disperse 
from an assembly or riot.204 Additional distinctions, such as non-violent ver-
sus violent offenses and first offenses versus repeat offenses, could also 
serve as benchmarks to create more targeted waiting period times.205 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Kurlychek et al., supra note 116, at 81 (“[I]t is perhaps surprising that knowledge 
about the proper use of criminal history information could lag so far behind the actual practice of 
using that information to make decisions about opportunities for ex-offenders.”); GAEBLER, supra 
note 24, at 16 (discussing how certain states have relied on scientific and academic scholarship to 
determine waiting periods for sealing and expungement statutes). 
 201 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A; NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 179.245 (Michie, Lexis 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (basing the timeframes for sealing criminal convictions on the type of 
offense that a petitioner is seeking to seal); see also PRIEST ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (arguing 
for shorter waiting periods for automatic sealing in Massachusetts). 
202 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245(1) (Lexis). The kind and severity of the criminal of-
fense correlate to the waiting period for sealing, with category E felony offenses requiring a sev-
en-year waiting period and category A and B felony offenses requiring a fifteen-year waiting peri-
od. See id. 
 203 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609A.02(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) (allow-
ing individuals to petition to seal criminal convictions after waiting periods of two years for a 
petty misdemeanor, four years for a gross misdemeanor, and five years for certain felony offens-
es); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245 (Lexis) (providing graduated waiting periods for particular 
categories of misdemeanor and felony offenses that correlate with the type and severity of those 
offenses); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (Supp. 2015) (permitting ex-offenders to petition to 
“annul” records of violations after one year, class A and B misdemeanors after three years, class B 
felonies after five years, and class A felonies after ten years). 
 204 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245 (Lexis). Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, 
§ 13A (2014) (stating that assault and battery involves a maximum penalty of two and one-half 
years in a house of correction or a maximum $1000 fine), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 2 
(2014) (stating that failure to respond to an order to depart from an assembly or riot carries a max-
imum punishment of one year of imprisonment or a maximum $500 fine). 
 205 See Love, supra note 32, at 1719 (explaining how certain states provide sealing or ex-
pungement remedies for first offenders or for conviction records relating to less serious criminal 
offenses); Silva, supra note 7, at 158 (stating that many states have expungement or sealing stat-
utes for first offenders and individuals who commit more minor offenses). 
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2. Eliminate the Discretionary Aspect of Chapter 276, Section 100C, 
Paragraph 2 of the Massachusetts General Laws or Clarify the 
Interpretation of the “Good Cause” Standard in Pon 
Although the decision in Pon provided an easier path for individuals to 
seal records of non-convictions under chapter 276, section 100C, paragraph 
2 of the Massachusetts General Laws, the newer standard still leaves judges 
with a substantial amount of discretion to decide whether or not to grant a 
petitioner’s request to seal a record of a dismissal or a nolle prosequi.206 In 
turn, this grant of discretion creates uncertainty and the possibility for unfair 
results and arbitrary decisions.207 Additionally, by retaining discretion and 
saddling the petitioner with the burden to show that “good cause” exists, the 
Massachusetts scheme adds an expense for petitioners that could be avoided 
through a more automatic and streamlined process.208 
To limit this discretion, the legislature should revise section 100C, par-
agraph 2 to make all non-conviction data eligible for automatic sealing.209 
Even though it abandoned the First Amendment standard dictated by the 
First Circuit, the Supreme Judicial Court in Pon maintained that the com-
mon-law presumption of public access should apply to records of dismissal 
or nolle prosequi.210 None of the sources the court cited in support of this 
proposition, however, establish that records pertaining to acquittals should 
be treated differently from nolle prosequis or dismissals for the purposes of 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 198–99 (stating that decisions regarding discretionary sealing under 
section 100C are made using a multifactor balancing test); DelSignore, supra note 191 (explaining 
that even though Pon lowered the burden on petitioners, decisions to seal records of dismissals 
and nolle prosequis are still discretionary); SJC Establishes New Standard to Seal, supra note 144 
(commenting on how the Pon decision created an easier to satisfy standard for sealing records of 
dismissals and nolle prosequis). 
 207 See Henson, supra note 27, at 397–98 (arguing that legislatures should create explicit 
standards for expungement statutes in order to effect the intent of legislatures and produce con-
sistent results); GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 24 (pointing out how discretion in the context of crim-
inal record sealing has the potential to produce inconsistent decisions about whether a particular 
record should be sealed). 
 208 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 197; GAEBLER, supra note 24, at 29 (describing how discretionary 
sealing statutes that require hearings involve an expense that is absent in more automatic or direct 
statutes). 
 209 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (2013) (allowing for automatic erasing of criminal rec-
ords pertaining to dismissals, acquittals, and nolle prosequis); SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 
4, at 36 (arguing that states should make sealing of non-conviction data automatic in order to pro-
mote broader access to relief from collateral consequences); Warnock & Murphy, supra note 66 
(arguing that there should be automatic expungement of records in all cases where individuals are 
charged with, but not convicted of an offense). 
 210 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 196–97 (“Although these records are not subject to a First Amend-
ment presumption, we conclude that they are subject to a common-law presumption of public 
access.”). 
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the common-law presumption of open access.211 Further, Connecticut, a 
state that has also recognized the principle of common-law presumption of 
public access to records, already has automatic sealing available for acquit-
tals, dismissals, nolle prosequis, and cases continued without prosecution.212 
Accordingly, there should be no legal barrier to legislatively extending au-
tomatic sealing to nolle prosequis and dismissals and thereby eliminating 
the distinction between paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 of section 100C.213 
If the legislature does not act to further change section 100C, the Su-
preme Judicial Court should streamline and clarify its interpretation of par-
agraph 2 in a subsequent decision.214 Although it is more receptive to re-
quests to seal, the new sealing standard under Pon involves a complex, six-
factor balancing test that also allows judges to consider “any relevant in-
formation” when determining whether or not to seal a record.215 In its deci-
sion, the Supreme Judicial Court blows both hot and cold when it suggests 
the scales are tipped towards sealing due to legislative intent while simulta-
neously emphasizing the public’s right to know, creating a comprehensive 
balancing test, and instructing judges to consider all relevant information.216 
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14 N.E.3d at 196–98 (referencing sources in support of its finding that a common-law presump-
tion of open access to applies to records of nolle prosequis and dismissals). 
 212 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(a) (authorizing automatic “erasure” of acquittals and 
dismissals “upon the expiration of the time to file a writ of error or take an appeal, if an appeal is 
not taken, or upon final determination of the appeal sustaining a finding of not guilty or a dismis-
sal, if an appeal is taken”); id. § 54-142a(c)(1)–(2) (authorizing the automatic “erasure” of nolle 
prosequis and cases continued without prosecution after thirteen months). 
 213 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 198 & n.24 (finding that a balancing test will apply to discretionary 
sealing determinations and leaving it to the legislature to make further changes to section 100C); 
see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-142a (allowing for automatic sealing of all non-conviction data); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C (authorizing automatic sealing for cases resulting in acquittals, 
findings of no probable cause, and no indictments, but requiring discretionary sealing for cases 
ending in dismissals and nolle prosequis).  
 214 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 200–02 (describing the six-prong balancing test that judges should 
consider when making discretionary sealing determinations); Massachusetts Ruling Reduces Ac-
cess, supra note 144 (arguing that the standard is unnecessarily complicated due to the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s overt deference to the legislature combined with its decision to provide a multi-
faceted and non-exclusive balancing test); see also SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 34, 42 
(pointing out that judicial discretion in the context of sealing decisions can jeopardize access to 
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 215 See Pon, 14 N.E.3d at 200–02. 
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One solution would be to substitute the existing balancing test with a 
shorter revised test that includes more tangible and objective factors.217 For 
example, instead of ambiguously instructing judges to consider the length 
of time since the underlying offense, the court should offer a more concrete 
timeline to guide judges making sealing decisions.218 Another solution 
would be to emulate New York and create a presumption in favor of sealing 
a record that can be rebutted by a prosecutor upon a showing that such a 
decision is contrary to the public interest.219 
Whether by legislative or judicial action, the sealing remedy for non-
conviction data under chapter 276, section 100C of the Massachusetts Gen-
eral Laws should be made more universally available.220 This would be con-
sonant with the legislative intent of the CORI Reform Act to diminish the 
collateral consequences associated with criminal records and would also 
further Massachusetts’s position as an exemplar for criminal record sealing 
reform.221  
CONCLUSION 
For many individuals, the existence of a criminal record can be a lin-
gering and debilitating handicap that serves to restrict access to employ-
ment, housing, and social opportunities long after a sentence has been com-
pleted. If the purpose of a criminal record is to protect society and not sole-
ly to punish individuals for their transgressions, states should increase ac-
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cess to sealing or expungement in order to facilitate reintegration and re-
duce recidivism. Through its recent legislative and judicial revisions, Mas-
sachusetts has established a comparatively robust and offender-oriented sys-
tem for the sealing and governance of criminal records. But, in order to 
emerge as the preeminent model for record sealing, Massachusetts should 
aim to recalibrate its standards in favor of personal privacy, opportunity, and 
individual welfare. 
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